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Abstract. Only recently have approaches to quantitative information
flow started to challenge the presumption that all leaks involving a given
number of bits are equally harmful. This paper proposes a framework to
capture the semantics of information, making quantification of leakage
independent of the syntactic representation of secrets. Secrets are defined
in terms of fields, which are combined to form structures; and a worth as-
signment is introduced to associate each structure with a worth (perhaps
in proportion to the harm that would result from disclosure). We show
how worth assignments can capture inter-dependence among structures
within a secret, modeling: (i) secret sharing, (ii) information-theoretic
predictors, and (iii) computational (as opposed to information-theoretic)
guarantees for security. Using non-trivial worth assignments, we general-
ize Shannon entropy, guessing entropy, and probability of guessing. For
deterministic systems, we give a lattice of information to provide an un-
derlying algebraic structure for the composition of attacks. Finally, we
outline a design technique to capture into worth assignments relevant
aspects of a scenario of interest.
1 Introduction
Quantitative information flow (QIF) is concerned with measuring how much
secret information leaks to an adversary through a system. The adversary is
presumed to have a priori information about the secrets before execution starts
and to access public observables as execution proceeds. By combining a priori
information and public observables, the adversary achieves a posteriori informa-
tion about the secrets. The leakage from an execution is the difference between
a posteriori and a priori information.
This definition of leakage depends on how information is measured. Cachin [1]
advocates that information measures not only include a way to calculate some
numeric value but also offer an operational interpretation, which describes what
aspect of interest is being quantified. Popular information measures include:
Shannon entropy [2–8], which measures how much information is leaked per
guess; guessing entropy [9, 10], which measures how many tries are required
before the secret is correctly guessed; and probability of guessing [11, 12], which
measures how likely it is that a secret is correctly inferred in a certain number
of tries.
These measures are best suited to sets of monolithic and equally valuable
secrets, so researchers have recently begun to consider richer scenarios. The g-
leakage framework [13] of Alvim et al. makes use of gain functions to quantify
the benefit of different guesses for the secret. However, identifying sufficiently
expressive yet not over-complicated gain-functions is often a challenge. Moreover,
that framework generalizes probability of guessing, but not Shannon entropy or
guessing entropy. Finally, it is not suitable to infinitely risk-averse adversaries.
In this paper we propose an approach that addresses these limitations; a detailed
comparison with g-leakage is given in Section 6.
We model a secret as being partitioned into fields, which are combined to form
structures. Since disclosure of different structures might cause different harms,
a worth assignment is introduced to associate a worth with each structure. For
instance, the secret corresponding to a client’s bank account might comprise two
10-digit structures: a pincode and a telephone number. Leaking the pincode has
the potential to cause considerable harm, so that structure would be assigned
high worth; the telephone number is public information, so this structure would
be assigned low worth.
Assuming that all structures have equal worth can lead to misleading com-
parisons between systems that leak structures with different worths but the same
numbers of bits. Conversely, ignoring the structure of secrets may lead to a de-
ceptive estimate of the harm from leaking different numbers of bits. Consider
two systems that differ in the way they represent a house address. In system C1,
standard postal addresses are used (i.e., a number, street name, and zip-code);
system C2 uses GPS coordinates (i.e., a latitude and a longtitude, each a signed
10-digit number). Under Shannon entropy with plausible sizes4 for address fields,
C1 requires 129 bits to represent a location that C2 represents using 69 bits. Yet
the same content is revealed whether C1 leaks its 129 bits or C2 leaks its 69 bits.
(The a priori information for addresses in C1 is not zero, since certain values
for a house number, street name, and zip-code can be ruled out. And a similar
argument can be made for C2, given knowledge of habitable terrain. Accounting
for idiosyncrasies in the syntactic representation of secrets, however, can be a
complicated task, hence an opportunity for error. Worth assignments avoid some
of that complexity.)
When secrets are not modeled as monolithic, distinct structures within a
given secret may be correlated. A clever adversary, thus, might infer information
about a structure with more worth (and presumably better protected) by attack-
ing a correlated structure with less worth (and presumably less well protected).
For instance, the location of a neighborhood is often correlated to the political
preferences of its residents, so an adversary may target a person’s house address
to infer information about what political party they support. Worth assignments
can model such correlations and adjust the relative worth of structures. More-
over, they can capture the computational complexity of inferring one structure
from the other, which is a common limitation of information theoretical ap-
4 Specifically, assume a 5-digit house number, a 20-character alphabetic street name,
and a 5-digit zip-code.
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proaches to QIF. As an example, a public RSA key is a perfect predictor, in
an information theoretical sense, for the corresponding private key. In practice,
however, the public key should not be assigned the same worth as the private
key because a realistic adversary is not expected to retrieve the latter from the
former in viable time.
In this paper, we propose measures of information worth that incorporate
the structure and worth of secrets. As in other QIF literature, we assume the
adversary performs attacks, controlling the low input to a probabilistic system
execution and observing the low outputs. An attack induces a probability dis-
tribution on the space of secrets according to what the adversary observes. This
characterization admits measures of information worth for the information con-
tained in each distribution; leakage is then defined as the difference in infor-
mation between distributions. Our approach generalizes probability of guessing,
guessing entropy, and Shannon entropy to admit non-trivial worth assignments.
Yet our work remains consistent with the Lattice of Information [14] for deter-
ministic systems, which is an underlying algebraic structure for sets of system
executions.
The main contributions of this paper are:
– We propose a framework of structures and worth assignments to capture the
semantics of information, making the quantification of leakage independent
of the particular representation chosen for secrets.
– We show how to use worth assignments to model the inter-dependence among
structures within a given secret, capturing practical scenarios including: (i)
secret sharing, (ii) information-theoretic predictors, and (iii) computational
(as opposed to information-theoretic) guarantees for security.
– We generalize Shannon entropy and guessing entropy to incorporate worth
explicitly, and we introduce other measures without traditional equivalents.
We show that our theory of measures of information worth and the g-leakage
framework are not comparable in general, although they do overlap.
– We prove that our measures of information worth are consistent with the
Lattice of Information for deterministic systems, which allows sound reason-
ing about the composition of attacks in such systems.
– We outline a design technique for worth assignments that capture the follow-
ing aspects of the scenario of interest: (i) secrecy requirements that determine
what structures are intrinsically sensitive, and by how much, (ii) consistency
requirements that ensure the adequacy of the worth assignment, and (iii) the
adversarial knowledge that may be of help in attacks.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our model for the
structure and worth of secrets in probabilistic systems. Section 3 uses worth
assignments to propose measures of information worth. Section 4 shows that the
proposed measures are consistent with respect to the Lattice of Information for
deterministic systems under composite attacks. Section 5 outlines a technique for
designing adequate worth assignments for a scenario of interest. Finally, Section 6
discusses related work, and Section 7 concludes the paper.
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2 Modeling the structure and worth of secrets
We decompose secrets into elementary units called fields, each a piece of infor-
mation with a domain. Let F = {f1, . . . , fm} denote the (finite) set of fields in
some scenario of interest, and for 1 ≤ i ≤ m, let domain(fi) be the domain of
values for field fi. A structure is a subset f ⊆ F , and if f = {fi1 , · · · , fik}, its
domain is given by domain(f) = domain(fi1) × · · · × domain(fik). The set of
all possible structures is the power set P(F) of fields, and the structure f = F
containing all fields is called the maximal structure.
A secret s is a mapping from the maximal structure to values, i.e., s =
〈s[f1], . . . , s[fm]〉, where s[fi] ∈ domain(fi) is the value assumed by field fi.
Hence the set S of possible secrets is S = domain(F). Given a secret s and a
(not necessarily maximal) structure f ⊆ F , we call a sub-secret s[f] the projection
of s on the domain of f, and the set of all possible sub-secrets associated with
that structure is S[f] = domain(f).
Structures may carry some valuable piece of information on their own. A
worth assignment attributes to each structure a non-negative, real number.
Worth may be seen as the utility obtained by an adversary who learns the
contents of the structure, or it may be seen as the damage suffered should the
contents of the structure become known to that adversary.
Definition 1 (Worth assignment). A worth assignment is a function ω :
P(F) → R from the set of structures to reals, satisfying for all f, f′ ∈ P(F): (i)
non-negativity: ω(f) ≥ 0, and (ii) monotonicity: f ⊆ f′ =⇒ ω(f) ≤ ω(f′).
We require non-negativity of ω because the knowledge of the contents of a struc-
ture should not carry a negative amount of information, and we require mono-
tonicity because every structure should be at least as sensitive as any of its parts.
Note that monotonicity implies that the worth of the maximal structure, ω(F),
is an upper bound for the worth of every structure.
Expressiveness of worth assignments. The worth of a structure should ap-
propriately represent the sensitivity of that structure in a scenario of interest.
Consider a medical database where a secret is a patient’s entire record, and struc-
tures are sub-sets of that record (e.g., a patient’s name, age, smoking habits).
The worth assigned to an individual’s smoking habits should reflect: (i) how
much the protector (i.e., the party interested in keeping the secret concealed)
cares about hiding whether an individual is a smoker, (ii) how much an adversary
would benefit from learning whether an individual is a smoker, and, more subtly,
(iii) how effective (information-theoretically and/or computationally) a predic-
tor an individual’s smoking habits are for other sensitive structures (for instance,
heavy smokers are more likely to develop lung cancer, and insurance companies
may deny them coverage based on that). Worth assignments can capture these
aspects, modeling also:
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a) Semantic-based leakage. Worth assignments provide a natural means to
abstract from syntactic idiosyncrasies and treat structures according to mean-
ing. In the bank system of Section 1, for instance, we would assign higher
worth to the 10-digit pincode than to the 10-digit telephone number, thus
distinguishing among eventual 10-digit leaks according to relevance:
ω({pin-code}) > ω({telephone number}).
Conversely, structures with equivalent meanings should be assigned the same
worth, regardless of representation. For instance, the worth of all structures
corresponding to an address should be the same, whether it is represented in
GPS coordinates or in the standard postal address format:
ω({GPS address}) = ω({postal address}).
b) Secret sharing. The combination of two structures may convey more worth
than the sum of their individual worths. In secret sharing, for instance, dif-
ferent persons retain distinct partial secrets (i.e., structures) that in isolation
give no information about the secret as a whole (i.e., the maximal struc-
ture), but that reveal the entire secret when combined. As another example,
a decryption key without any accompanying ciphertext is of little worth, so
each corresponding structure should have, in isolation, a worth close to zero.
When combined, however, the benefit to the adversary exceeds the sum of
their individual worths:
ω({ciphertext, decryption key})≫ ω({ciphertext}) + ω({decryption key}).
c) Correlation of structures. Knowledge of a particular structure may imply
knowledge of another (e.g., if the adversary has access to tax files, learning
someone’s tax identification number implies learning their name as well), or
it may increase the probability of learning another structure (recall the corre-
lation between smoking habits and lung cancer). An adversary might exploit
correlations between different structures within a given secret to obtain infor-
mation about a more important (and presumably better protected) structure
through a less important (and presumably less well protected) structure. By
considering the distribution on secrets and the capabilities of the adversary,
we can adjust the relative worth of one structure with respect to any other,
thus avoiding potentially harmful loopholes. In particular, worth assignments
can model:
(i) Information-theoretic predictors. The worth of a structure should
reflect the worth it carries, via correlation, from other structures. For
instance, when an individual’s identity can be recovered with 60% prob-
ability from the combination of the zip-code, date of birth, and gen-
der [15], we might enforce ω({zip-code, date of birth, gender}) to be at
least as great as 60% of the worth ω({identity}). More generally, given
any two structures f, f′ ∈ P(F), the requirement
ω(f) ≥ correlation(f, f′) · ω(f′)
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might be imposed on a worth assignment ω. Here correlation(f, f′) is a
function representing how well f predicts f′.
(ii) Computational effort. Even perfect information-theoretic correla-
tions among structures may not be of practical use for the adversary
(e.g., the correlation of public and private RSA keys). Worth assign-
ments can reflect this. We can impose, on any two structures f, f′ ∈
P(F), the requirement
ω(f) > ω(f′)/cost(f, f′),
where cost(f, f′) is a function of the computational effort needed to ob-
tain f′ from f.
2.1 A worth-based approach to QIF
s
(secret)
a
(attack)
C
(System)
o
(observable)
Fig. 1: A system with one
high input, one low input,
and one low output.
We adopt a probabilistic version of the model
of deterministic systems and attacks proposed by
Köpf and Basin [16]. Let S be a finite set of secrets,
A be a finite set of adversary-controlled inputs or
attacks, and O be a finite set of observables. A
(probabilistic computational) system is a family
C = {(S,O, Ca)}a∈A of (information-theoretic)
channels parametrized by the adversary-chosen
input a ∈ A. Each (S,O, Ca) is a channel in which S is the channel input,
O is the channel output, and Ca is a |S| × |O| matrix of conditional probability
distributions called the channel matrix. Each entry Ca(s, o) in the matrix repre-
sents the probability of the system producing observable o when the secret is s
and the adversary-chosen low input is a. Given a probability distribution pS on
S, the behavior of the system under attack a is described by the joint distribution
pa(s, o) = pS(s) · Ca(s, o), with marginal pa(o) =
∑
s pa(s, o), and conditional
distribution pa(s|o) = pa(s, o)/pa(o) whenever pa(o) > 0 (and similarly for pa(s)
and pa(o|s)).
As is usual in QIF, assume that the adversary knows the probability distri-
bution pS on the set of secrets and the family of channel matrices C describing
the system’s behavior. By controlling the low input, the adversary can launch
an attack as follows: pick a ∈ A so the channel matrix is set to Ca, thereby ma-
nipulating the behavior of the system. The adversary’s goal is to infer as much
information as possible from the secret, given knowledge about how the system
works, the attack fed to the system, and the observations made as the system
executes.
Let Ω be the set of all possible worth assignments for the structures of S,
Pr(S) be the set of all probability distributions on S, and CA be the set of channel
matrices induced by attacks a ∈ A. A measure of information worth is a function
ν : Ω×Pr(S)×CA → R+. The quantity ν(ω, pS , Ca) represents the a posteriori
information with respect to S revealed by attack Ca ∈ CA, given probability
distribution pS ∈ Pr(S) on secrets and worth assignment ω ∈ Ω. Before any
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attack is performed, the adversary has some a priori information about the
secret due to knowledge of pS and ω only, and we represent this information by
ν(ω, pS). Because the attack is expected to disclose secret information to the
adversary, the leakage from an attack Ca is defined as the difference
5, between
the a posteriori and a priori information associated with Ca.
Before discussing measures of information, we will fix some additional no-
tation. For any S ′ ⊆ S we denote by pS(·|S ′) the normalization of pS with
respect to S ′, i.e., for every s ∈ S, pS(s|S ′) = pS(s)/pS(S ′) if s ∈ S ′, and
pS(s|S ′) = 0 otherwise. The support of a distribution pS is denoted supp(pS).
A set P = {S1, . . . ,Sn} is a partition on S iff: (i)
⋃
Si∈P Si = S, and (ii) for
1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ n, Si ∩ Sj = ∅. Each Si ∈ P is called a block in the par-
tition. We denote the set of all partitions in S by LoI(S) 6. Following [10],
any partition Pa = {So1 , . . . ,Son} on S induced by the attack a can be seen
as a random variable with carrier {So1 , . . . ,Son} and probability distribution
pS(Soi) =
∑
s∈Soi pS(s).
3 Measures of information worth
3.1 Operational interpretation of measures revisited
One of Shannon’s greatest insights, which ultimately led to the creation of the
field of information theory, can be formulated as: information is describable in
terms of answers to questions. The more information the adversary has about
a random variable, the fewer questions of a certain type that must be asked in
order to infer its value, and the smaller the Shannon entropy of this random
variable.
Formally, the Shannon entropy of a probability distribution pS is defined as
SE(pS) = −
∑
s pS(s) log pS(s), and the conditional Shannon entropy of pS given
a channel Ca is defined as SE(pS , Ca) =
∑
o∈O pa(o)SE(pa(·|o)). A possible
operational interpretation of this measure is: The adversary can pose questions
Does S ∈ S ′?, for some S ′ ⊆ S, to an oracle, and Shannon entropy quantifies
the expected minimum number of guesses needed to infer the entire secret with
certainty. A decrease in the Shannon entropy of the secret space caused by a
system can be seen as the leakage from the system. This question-and-answer
interpretation has an algorithmic equivalent: S is seen as a search space, and by
repeatedly asking questions Does S ∈ S ′?, the adversary is performing a binary
search on the space of secrets. Now, Shannon entropy corresponds to the average
height of the optimal binary search tree.
However, Shannon entropy is not the unique meaningful measure of informa-
tion. Guessing entropy allows the adversary to pose a different type of question;
5 Braun et al. [12] make a distinction between this definition of leakage, called additive
leakage, and multiplicative leakage, where the ratio (rather than the difference) of the
a posteriori and a priori information is taken. Divisions by zero avoided, the results
of this paper apply to both definitions. For simplicity, we adopt the first.
6 LoI stands for Lattice of Information. The reason for this nomenclature is clarified
in Section 4.1.
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Measure
d1: Type of
question
d2: Num.
questions
in attack
d3: Prob.
of attack
successful
Shannon entropy
Does S ∈ S ′? ?
S is inferred
SE(pS) with prob. 1
Guessing entropy
Is S = s? ?
S is inferred
NG(pS) with prob. 1
Prob. of guessing
Is S = s?
n guesses
?
PGn(pS) allowed
Prob. of guessing under ∈
Does S ∈ S ′?
n guesses
?
PG∈n(pS) allowed
Table 1: Operational interpretation for three traditional information-flow mea-
sures, and a new measure. The question mark indicates the value of measure.
whereas probability of guessing quantifies a different aspect of the scenario of
interest. Yet, the operational interpretation of these measures also can be de-
scribed in terms of questions and answers as follows.
For simplicity, assume that elements of S are ordered by decreasing proba-
bilities, i.e., if 1 ≤ i < j ≤ |S| then pS(si) ≥ pS(sj). The guessing entropy of pS
is defined as NG(pS) =
∑|S|
i=1 i · pS(si), and the conditional guessing entropy of
pS given a channel Ca is defined as NG(pS , Ca) =
∑
o∈O pa(o)NG(pa(·|o)). An
operational interpretation of guessing entropy is: The adversary can pose ques-
tions Is S = s?, for some s ∈ S, to an oracle, and guessing entropy quantifies the
expected number of guesses needed to learn the entire secret. Algorithmically,
guessing entropy is the expected number of steps needed for the adversary to
find the secret using linear search on the space of secrets.
Still assuming that the elements of S are in decreasing order of probabili-
ties, the probability of guessing the secret in n tries is defined as PGn(pS) =∑n
i=1 pS(si). The conditional probability of guessing of pS in n tries given a
channel Ca is defined as PGn(pS , Ca) =
∑
o∈O pa(o)PGn(pa(·|o)). An opera-
tional interpretation of probability of guessing in n tries is: The adversary can
pose questions Is S = s?, for some s ∈ S, and the measure quantifies the proba-
bility of guessing the entire secret in n tries. Algorithmically, the probability of
guessing is the chance of success by an adversary performing a linear search on
the space of secrets, after n steps.
Note that the landscape of these measures is covered by varying three di-
mensions of their operational interpretation:
d1: the type of question the adversary is allowed to pose;
d2: the number of questions (guesses) the adversary is allowed to pose;
d3: the probability of success, i.e., that of the adversary inferring the secret.
Table 1 summarizes the operational interpretation of Shannon entropy, guess-
ing entropy and probability of guessing in terms of dimensions d1, d2, and d3.
The type of question is fixed for each measure; the other two dimensions have a
dual behavior: one is fixed and the other one is quantified. In particular, Shannon
entropy and guessing entropy fix the probability of guessing the secret to be 1
and quantify the number of questions necessary to do so; probability of guessing
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fixes the number of guesses to be n and quantifies the probability of the secret
being guessed.
We add a fourth row to Table 1 for a measure whose operational interpreta-
tion is: The adversary can pose questions Does S ∈ S ′?, for some S ′ ⊆ S, to an
oracle, and the measure quantifies the probability of guessing the entire secret in
n tries. Algorithmically, this measure is analogous to the probability of guessing
but allowing the adversary to perform a binary (rather than linear) search on
the space of secrets. The probability of guessing under ∈, in n tries, of a distri-
bution pS is defined as PG
∈
n(pS) = maxP∈LoI(S),|P|≤2n
∑
S′∈P,|S′|=1 pS(·|S
′). The
conditional probability of guessing under ∈, in n tries, of pS given a channel Ca
is defined as PG∈n(pS , Ca) =
∑
o∈O pa(o)PG
∈
n(pa(·|o)).
Worth as a new dimension. The traditional measures in Table 1 presume
secrets are monolithic and equally sensitive. We relax this restriction by intro-
ducing a new dimension to the operational interpretation of measures:
d4: the worth the adversary extracts from a guess.
We can enrich the landscape of measures of information with new definitions
that exploit the extra freedom allowed by the new dimension d4. As with the
traditional case, for each measure we fix the type of question the adversary is
allowed to pose and vary the role played by the other three dimensions. Hence
we classify the measures into three groups:
– W -measures quantify the worth extracted from an attack when the follow-
ing dimensions are fixed: (i) the number of questions that can be posed, and
(ii) the required probability of success.
– N -measures quantify the number of guesses the adversary needs in order
to succeed when the following dimensions are fixed: (i) the required proba-
bility of success, and (ii) a minimum worth-threshold to extract as measured
according to a W -measure ν modeling the adversary’s preferences.
– P-measures quantify the probability of an attack being successful when
the following dimensions are fixed: (i) the number of questions that can be
posed, and (ii) a minimum worth-threshold to extract as measured according
to a W -measure ν modeling the adversary’s preferences.
According to this classification, Shannon entropy and guessing entropy are
N -measures, and probability of guessing is a P -measure (all of them implicitly
using a trivial worth assignment). Table 2 organizes the measures of information
worth we propose in this paper. The new table subsumes Table 1 of traditional
measures.
W -measures are used to specify the fixed worth-threshold necessary to fully
define P -measures and N -measures, and hence we will start our discussion with
them. First we introduce a few conventions.
Assume that the set S of secrets follows a probability distribution pS , and
that its fields are given by set F . Assume also that an appropriate worth as-
signment ω is provided. For an attack Ca producing observables in a set O, the
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W -measures:
quantifying worth
d1: Type of
question
d2: Num.
questions
in attack
d3: Prob.
of attack
successful
d4: Worth of
payoff to attacker
Worth of certainty
Does S ∈ S ′?
1 guess success with
?
WCER(ω, pS) allowed prob. 1
W -vulnerability
Does S ∈ S ′?
1 guess ?
WV (ω, pS) allowed (product prob. × worth)
Worth of exp. =
Is S = s?
n guesses success with ?
WEXP
=
n,ν(ω, pS) allowed prob. 1 (using W -measure ν)
N -measures:
quantifying number
of guesses
d1: Type of
question
d2: Num.
questions
in attack
d3: Prob.
of attack
successful
d4: Worth of
payoff to attacker
W -guessing entropy
Is S = s? ?
success with extracted worth w
WNGw,ν(ω, pS) prob. 1 (using W -measure ν)
W -Shannon entropy
Does S ∈ S ′? ?
success with extracted worth w
WSEw,ν(ω, pS) prob. 1 (using W -measure ν)
P-measures:
quantifying prob. of
success
d1: Type of
question
d2: Num.
questions
in attack
d3: Prob.
of attack
successful
d4: Worth of
payoff to attacker
W -prob. of guessing
Does S ∈ S ′?
n guesses
?
extracted worth w
WPG
∈
w,n,ν(ω, pS) allowed (using W -measure ν)
Table 2: Operational interpretation for measures of information worth. The ques-
tion mark indicates the value of the measure.
information conveyed by each o ∈ O is the information contained in the prob-
ability distribution pa(·|o) that o induces on secrets. A measure of information
worth is composable if the value of an attack can be calculated as a function of in-
formation conveyed by each observable: ν(ω, pS , Ca) =
∑
o∈O pa(o)ν(ω, pS(·|o)).
All measures we propose in this paper are composable, but they easily extend to
worst-case versions. Finally, define the worth of a secret s ∈ S to be the worth
of learning all of its fields, i.e., ω(s) = ω(F).
3.2 W -measures
Worth of certainty. Consider a risk-averse adversary who is allowed to guess
any part of the secret—as opposed to the secret as a whole—but who will do so
only when absolutely certain the guess will succeed. To model this scenario, we
note that a field is deducible with certainty from pS if its contents is the same in
every secret in the support of the distribution. Formally, the deducible fields from
pS are defined as ded(pS) = F \ {f ∈ F | ∃s′, s′′ ∈ supp(pS) : s′[f ] 6= s′′[f ]}.
For an attack Ca producing observables in a set O, the deducible fields from
each o ∈ O are those that can be inferred from the probability distribution
ded(pa(·|o)) that o induces on secrets. The information contained in a probability
distribution is defined as the worth of its deducible fields.
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Definition 2 (Worth of certainty). The worth of certainty of pS is defined
as WCER(ω, pS) = ω(ded(pS)). The worth of certainty of an attack Ca is a
W -measure defined as WCER(ω, pS, Ca) =
∑
o∈O pa(o)WCER(ω, pa(·|o)).
W -vulnerability. Consider an adversary who can guess a less likely struc-
ture, provided that this structure is worth enough to yield a higher overall
expected gain. Formally, for every structure f ⊆ F , we define pS(f) to be the
probability that f can be deduced by an adversary knowing the distribution pS :
pS(f) = maxx∈S[f]
∑
s∈S,s[f]=x pS(s). A rational adversarymaximizes the product
of probability and worth, so we define W -vulnerability as follows.
Definition 3 (W -vulnerability). The W -vulnerability of pS is defined as
WV (ω, pS) = maxf⊆F (pS(f)ω(f)). The W -vulnerability of an attack Ca is a
W -measure defined as WV (ω, pS , Ca) =
∑
o∈O pa(o)WV (ω, pa(·|o)).
Worth of expectation under =. Consider an adversary who can explore the
space of secrets using brute force, i.e., by guessing the possible values of the
secret, one by one. Assume that this adversary is allowed n ≥ 0 tries. The aim is
to extract as much worth as possible according to some W -measure ν modeling
the adversary’s preferences. This leads to the following measure.
Definition 4 (Worth of expectation under =). Let n ≥ 0 be the maximum
number of tries allowed for the adversary. The worth of expectation under = of
pS is WEXP
=
n,ν(ω, pS) = maxS′⊆S,|S′|≤n
(
pS(S ′)ω(F) + pS(S¯ ′)ν(ω, pS(·|S¯ ′))
)
,
where S¯ ′ = S\S ′. The worth of expectation under = of an attack Ca is a W -
measure defined as WEXP=n,ν(ω, pS , Ca) =
∑
o∈O pa(o)WEXP
=
n,ν(ω, pa(·|o)).
3.3 N -measures
W -guessing entropy. Consider an adversary who can ask questions Is S = s?
but who, instead of having to guess the secret as a whole, can fix a minimum
worth 0 ≤ w ≤ ω(F) to obtain according to some W -measure ν modeling the
adversary’s preferences. A generalized version of guessing entropy quantifies the
expected number of questions to obtain a minimum worth w from such attacks.
Definition 5 (W -guessing entropy). Let 0 ≤ w ≤ ω(F) be a worth thresh-
old quantified according to a W -measure ν. The W -guessing entropy of pS is
WNGw,ν(ω, pS) = minS′⊆S,ν(ω,pS(·|S′))≥w
(
pS(S¯ ′)NG(pS(·|S¯ ′)) + pS(S ′)(|S¯ ′|+ 1)
)
,
where S¯ ′ = S\S ′. The W -guessing entropy of an attack Ca is a N -measure de-
fined as WNGw,ν(ω, pS, Ca) =
∑
o∈O pa(o)WNGw,ν(ω, pa(·|o)).
W -Shannon entropy. Consider an adversary who is allowed to ask questions
of the type Does S ∈ S ′? but who, instead of having to guess the entire secret,
can fix a minimum worth-threshold 0 ≤ w ≤ ω(F) to extract according to a
W -measure ν. A generalized version of Shannon entropy quantifies the expected
number of questions necessary to obtain worth w from the attacks.
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Definition 6 (W -Shannon entropy). Let 0 ≤ w ≤ ω(F) be a worth threshold
quantified according to a W -measure ν. The W -Shannon entropy of pS is defined
asWSEw,ν(ω, pS) = minP∈LoI(S),∀S′∈P ν(ω,pS(·|S′))≥w SE(pP). The W -Shannon
entropy of the distribution pS, given an attack Ca, is a N -measure defined as
WSEw,ν(ω, pS , Ca) =
∑
o∈O pa(o)WSEw,ν(ω, pa(·|o)).
3.4 P-measures
W -Probability of guessing. Consider an adversary allowed to pose n ques-
tions of the type Does S ∈ S ′?. The following measure quantifies the chances of
extracting worth 0 ≤ w ≤ ω(F), as measured by some W -measure ν, from an
attack. Given n questions, at most 2n blocks can be inspected, which leads to
the following mathematical definition.
Definition 7 (W -probability of guessing). Let 0 ≤ w ≤ ω(F) be a worth
threshold quantified according to a W -measure ν, and n ≥ 0 be the maximum
number of tries allowed for the adversary. The W -probability of guessing of
pS is WPG
∈
w,n,ν(ω, pS) = maxP∈LoI(S),|P|≤2n
∑
S′∈P,ν(ω,pS(·|S′))≥w pS(S
′). The
W -probability of guessing of an attack Ca is a P-measure defined as follows:
WPG∈
w,n,ν(ω, pS, Ca) =
∑
o∈O pa(o)WPG
∈
w,n,ν(ω, pa(·|o)).
3.5 Mathematical properties of measures of information worth
The proposed measures of information worth by definition always yield non-
negative values. It is a subtler matter, however, to show that they also always
yield non-negative values for leakage. Theorem 1 below shows that non-negativity
of leakage holds for our measures of information worth under certain conditions.
Because N -measures and P -measures have a W -measure as an input parame-
ter to model the preferences of the adversary, we restrict consideration to W -
measures presenting a consistent behavior with respect to the number of possible
values for the secret. Intuitively, whenever some secret value is ruled out from
the search space, the adversary’s information about the secret, according to the
measure, does not decrease. Formally:
Definition 8 (Monotonicity with respect to blocks). Given a set S of
secrets, a W -measure ν is said to be monotonic with respect to blocks if, for
every worth assignment ω, every probability distribution pS on S, and all subsets
(i.e., blocks) S ′,S ′′ of S such that S ′ ⊆ S ′′, it is the case that ν(ω, pS(·|S ′)) ≥
ν(ω, pS(·|S ′′)). When ν quantifies uncertainty, the inequality is reversed.
At first it might seem that monotonicity with respect to blocks would hold
for everyW -measure. But this is not the case. It does hold for worth of certainty,
for instance, but it does not hold for W -vulnerability, as shown in the following
example.
Example 1. The vulnerability of a probability distribution pS is calculated as
V (pS) = maxs p(s). Consider the block S
′ = {s1, s2, s3, s4} of secrets, where
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p(s1) = 1/2 and p(s2) = p(s3) = p(s4) = 1/6. Then V (S
′) = 1/2. Suppose that
S′ is split into blocks S′′ = {s1} and S′′′ = {s2, s3, s4}. Hence, even if S′′′ ⊆ S′,
we have V (S′′′) = 1/3 < V (S′). Since traditional vulnerability is a particular
case of W -vulnerability (Theorem 2), the example is also valid for the former.
In probabilistic systems, the adversary’s knowledge is not tied to blocks of
secrets but to probability distributions induced by observations. The concept of
monotonicity is generalized accordingly.
Definition 9 (Monotonicity with respect to observations). Given a set S
of secrets, a measure of information worth ν is said to be monotonic with respect
to observations if for every worth assignment ω, every probability distribution pS
on S, and all observables o ∈ O: ν(ω, pS(·|o)) ≥ ν(ω, pS(·)). When ν quantifies
uncertainty, then the inequality is reversed.
From Example 1 it follows that W -vulnerability is not monotonic with re-
spect to observations. It is easy to see, however, that worth of uncertainty is.
The following theorem establishes the non-negativity of leakage by showing
that the adversary’s information after an attack is never smaller than the a priori
information.
Theorem 1. Let S be a set of secrets composed by the fields in F and let Ca be
an attack. Let ν be a W -measure that is monotonic with respect to observations,
n ≥ 0 be the number of guesses allowed for the adversary, and 0 ≤ w ≤ ω(F).
For every distribution pS on S and every worth assignment ω:
WCER(ω, pS , Ca) ≥WCER(ω, pS) (1)
WV (ω, pS , Ca) ≥WV (ω, pS) (2)
WEXP=n,ν(ω, pS , Ca) ≥WEXP
=
n,ν(ω, pS) (3)
WNGw,ν(ω, pS , Ca) ≤WNGw,ν(ω, pS) (4)
WSEw,ν(ω, pS , Ca) ≤WSEw,ν(ω, pS) (5)
WPG∈
w,n,ν(ω, pS , Ca) ≥WPG
∈
w,n,ν(ω, pS) (6)
3.6 Relation with traditional measures
We now substantiate our claim that Shannon entropy, guessing entropy, and
probability of guessing (and, in particular, vulnerability) are measures of infor-
mation that ignore the worth of structures. Define the binary worth assignment
ωbin that attributes zero worth to any proper structure, i.e., ωbin(f) = 1 if f = F ,
ωbin(f) = 0 if f ⊂ F . Theorem 2 asserts that the traditional measures implicitly
use ωbin as a worth assignment, which means that only the maximal structure is
deemed to be conveying relevant information. For instance, the theorem states
that Shannon entropy is the particular case of W -Shannon entropy in which the
adversary must perform a binary search to the maximum level of granularity,
i.e., until the secret is unequivocally identified.
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Theorem 2. Let S be a set of secrets distributed according to pS, and let Ca be
an attack. Then the following hold:
SE(pS , Ca) =WSE1,WCER(ωbin , pS , Ca) (7)
NG(pS , Ca) =WNG1,WCER(ωbin , pS , Ca) (8)
PGn(pS , Ca) =WEXP
=
n,νnull
(ωbin , pS , Ca) (∀n ≥ 0) (9)
V (pS |Ca) =WV (ωbin , pS , Ca) (10)
where νnull is a W -measure such that νnull (ω, pS) = 0 for every ω and pS.
4 Algebraic structure for measures of information worth
in deterministic systems
4.1 Deterministic systems and attack sequences
In a deterministic system C, for each pair of high input s ∈ S and and low
input a ∈ A, a single output o ∈ O is produced with probability 1. Therefore
each attack a ∈ A induces a partition Pa on the set of secrets, where each
block Sa,o ∈ Pa contains all secrets mapped to o when the low input to the
system is a, i.e., Sa,o = {s ∈ S|C(s, a) = o}. When the attack is clear from the
context, we write So for Sa,o. An attack step can be described mathematically as
C(s, a) ∈ Pa, which is a two-phase process: (i) the adversary chooses a partition
Pa on S, corresponding to attack a ∈ A, and (ii) the system responds with the
block So ∈ Pa that contains the secret.
The adversary may perform multiple attack steps for the same secret. The
adversary combines information acquired in an attack sequence aˆ = at1 , . . . , atk
of k steps by intersecting the partitions corresponding to each step in the se-
quence, thereby obtaining a refined partition7 Paˆ =
⋂
a∈aˆ Pa. Hence an attack
sequence aˆ can be modeled as a single attack where the adversary chooses the
partition Paˆ as the low input to the system and obtains as an observable the
block to which the secret s belongs. Formally, C(s, aˆ) ∈ Paˆ holds.
4.2 The Lattice of Information and the leakage from attack
sequences
The set of all partitions on a finite set S forms a complete lattice called the Lattice
of Information (LoI) [14]. The order on lattice elements is the refinement order
⊑ on partitions: P ⊑ P′ iff for every Sj ∈ P′ there exists Si ∈ P such that
Sj ⊆ Si. The relation ⊑ is a partial order on the set of all partitions on S. The
join ⊔ of two elements in the LoI is the intersection of partitions, and their meet
⊓ is the transitive closure union of partitions. Given two partitions P and P′,
both P ⊔ P′ and P ⊓ P′ are partitions as well. We fix the deterministic system
and let the elements in the LoI model possible executions. By controlling the
7 The intersection of partitions is defined as P ∩ P′ =
⋃
So∈P,So′∈P
′ So ∩ So′ .
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low input to the system, the adversary chooses among executions, so the LoI
serves as an algebraic representation of the partial order on the attack sequences
the adversary can perform. Each attack sequence aˆ corresponds to one element
Paˆ—i.e., the partition it induces—in the LoI for S.
An attack sequence can be seen as a path in the LoI. Each attack sequence
is mapped to an element in the lattice, and by performing an attack step the
adversary may obtain a finer partition on the space of secrets, therefore moving
up in the lattice to a state with more information. The leakage of information
from an attack sequence is, thus, the difference in the measures of information
worth between the initial and final partition in the path. This definition of
leakage encompasses the traditional definitions for Shannon entropy, guessing
entropy, and probability of guessing.
4.3 Consistency with respect to the LoI
The Lattice of Information has been used as an underlying algebraic structure
for deterministic systems, and it provides an elegant way to reason about leakage
under composition of attacks. Yasuoka and Terauchi [17] showed that orderings
based on probability of guessing, guessing entropy, and Shannon entropy are all
equivalent, and Malacaria [10] showed that they coincide with the refinement
order in the LoI. These results establish that the traditional measures behave
well with respect to the LoI: the finer a partition is, the more information (or
the less uncertainty) the measures attribute to it.
All measures of information worth proposed in Section 3 behave in a sim-
ilar way. That is, they are consistent with respect to the LoI. This is formally
established in the following theorem.
Theorem 3. Let S be a set of secrets composed by the fields in F . For all P
and P′ in the LoI for S, the following are equivalent:
P ⊑P′ (11)
∀ω ∀pS WCER(ω, pS,P) ≤WCER(ω, pS,P
′) (12)
∀ω ∀pSWV (ω, pS,P) ≤WV (ω, pS ,P
′) (13)
∀n ∀ν ∀ω ∀pS WEXP
=
n,ν(ω, pS,P) ≤WEXP
=
n,ν(ω, pS ,P
′) (14)
∀w ∀ν ∀ω ∀pS WNGw,ν(ω, pS,P) ≥WNGw,ν(ω, pS ,P
′) (15)
∀w ∀ν ∀ω ∀pS WSEw,ν(ω, pS,P) ≥WSEw,ν(ω, pS ,P
′) (16)
∀w ∀n ∀ν ∀ω ∀pSWPG
∈
w,n,ν(ω, pS,P) ≤WPG
∈
w,n,ν(ω, pS,P
′) (17)
where n ≥ 0; 0 ≤ w ≤ ω(f), and ν ranges over all composable W -measures
that are consistent with respect to the LoI plus the worth of certainty measure
WCER. In (15) and (16) ν is restricted to be monotonic with respect to blocks.
5 A design technique for worth assignments
We now outline a general technique to capture into worth assignments relevant
aspects of some given scenario of interest.
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Fig. 2: Scheme of a design technique
for worth assignments.
The domain of worth assignments is
the power set P(F) of the set F of fields.
By endowing P(F) with the set-inclusion
ordering, we obtain a (complete) lattice
of structures LF . For every structure f ∈
P(F) there is a partition Pf, belonging to
the LoI, distinguishing structure f. For-
mally, Pf = {Ss[f]=x | x ∈ S[f]} where
to every x ∈ S[f] corresponds the block
Ss[f]=x = {s ∈ S | s[f] = x}. Proposition 1
shows that the set-inclusion ordering on structures coincides with the refinement
relation on the corresponding partitions, thereby establishing that the space of
structures is a sub-lattice of the LoI.
Proposition 1. For every f, f′ ∈ P(F): f ⊆ f′ iff Pf ⊑ Pf′ .
Hence, the space of structures LF is isomorphic to the complete lattice formed
by all partitions Pf for f ⊆ F , ordered by the refinement relation ⊑.
Figure 2 depicts our design technique, which constructs a worth assignment
having as input the following three parameters describing a scenario of interest.
a) Adversarial knowledge is any relevant information the adversary knows
from sources external to the system (e.g., newspapers, common-sense, other
systems). As usual in QIF and privacy, adversarial knowledge is modeled as
a probability distribution on the space of secrets [18–20].
b) Secrecy requirements reflect the protector’s (i.e., the party interested in
hiding the secret) interests, specifying which structures are intrinsically sen-
sitive and which are only contingently sensitive, that is, sensitive only to
the extent they possibly reveal information about other intrinsically sensitive
structures. (E.g., a patient’s lung cancer status may be considered intrinsi-
cally sensitive, whereas smoking habits may be considered sensitive only to
the extent that they reveal information about the patient’s cancer status.)
Secrecy requirements are represented as a partial function from the space of
structures to non-negative reals that associates every intrinsically sensitive
structures with an appropriate, a priori, worth.
c) Consistency requirements are mathematical properties imposed on worth
assignments. Non-negativity and monotonicity are considered syntactic con-
sistency requirements—they depend only on the representation of secrets,
not on their meaning. Syntactic requirements alone are not sufficient to guar-
antee the consistency of worth assignments. Often semantic requirements
also need to be considered, such as the adjustments for information-theoretic
predictors and computational cost from Section 2. Other examples are (i)
inclusion-exclusion consistency: the worth of the composition of two struc-
tures is equal to the sum of their individual worths, minus the worth they
share: ω(f ⊔ f′) = ω(f) + ω(f′) − ω(f ⊓ f′), and (ii) independence: statistically
independent structures add their worth; so if Pf′ and Pf′ are independent
then ω(f ⊔ f′) = ω(f) + ω(f′).
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Once the inputs are provided, a design proceeds as follows:
1. Construct the complete lattice LF of structures.
2. Use secrecy requirements to annotate each element Pf in LF , where f ∈ P(F)
is a intrinsically sensitive structure, with the appropriate a priori worth in
accordance to the protector’s interests.
3. Using the adversarial knowledge, derive a probability distribution pS . Par-
titions in the LoI can be seen as random variables, so use pS to derive the
probability distribution in the elements of LF .
4. Take some well established measure of information ν (e.g., guessing en-
tropy), and for every structure f′ ∈ P(F), update its worth according to
ω(f′) = maxf∈P(F) ν(Pf′ |Pf). Repeat until all structures respect the consis-
tency requirements.
This design technique captures the adversarial knowledge into the worth as-
signment, and the worth of structures will inherit the operational interpretation
of the measure ν chosen in step 4. However, because the procedure depends on
the probability distribution on the elements of LF , certain semantic requirements
only can be approximated. An example is the inclusion-exclusion principle: if it
were to be preserved for all probability distributions pS , then it would be a
valuation on the lattice, which is known not to exist [21].
6 Related work
Relation with g-leakage. We start by reviewing g-leakage [13]. Given a
set S of possible secrets and a finite, nonempty set Z of allowable guesses,
a gain function is a function g : Z × S → [0, 1]. Given a gain function g,
the prior g-vulnerability of a probability distribution pS is defined as Vg(pS) =
maxz∈Z
∑
s∈S pS(s)g(z, s). Given also a channel Ca from secrets in S to observ-
ables in O, the posterior g-vulnerability is Vg(pS , Ca) =
∑
o∈O p(o)Vg(pa(·|o)).
The g-vulnerability is converted into g-entropy by taking its logarithm:Hg(pS) =
− logVg(pS) and Hg(pS , Ca) = − logVg(pS , Ca). Finally, g-leakage is the differ-
ence between prior and posterior g-entropies: Lg(pS , Ca) = Hg(pS)−Hg(pS , Ca).
Comparing our work with g-leakage, two main points are noteworthy:
(i) g-leakage as defined in [13] cannot capture scenarios where the worth of
a structure depends on the probability of that structure. Hence worth of
certainty and W -Shannon entropy cannot be modeled using g-leakage.
Proposition 2. Given a set of secrets S and a set of guesses Z, there
is no gain function g : Z × S → R+ such that, for all priors pS on S,
and all partitions P on the LoI for S, it is the case that: (i) Vg(pS) =
WCER(ω, pS), or (ii) Vg(pS) = SE(pS), or (iii) Hg(pS) = SE(pS).
(ii) g-leakage and measures of information worth coincide in some scenarios,
and when it happens, our approach can give practical operational inter-
pretations to gain functions—in fact, a common criticism of the g-leakage
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framework concerns the challenge of identifying adequate functions for a
scenario of interest. Take guessing entropy, as an example. Take an al-
lowable guess z to be an ordered list Λ(S ′) of the secret elements of a
subset S ′ ⊆ S of secrets. A guess Λ(S ′) means that the adversary believes
that the secret belongs to the set S ′. Moreover, in a brute-force attack
the adversary would guess secrets in that same order they appear in that
list. Then, for the binary worth assignment ωbin
8, define a gain function
gωbin (Λ(S
′), s) = −Λ(S ′)(s) if s ∈ S ′, and gωbin (Λ(S
′), s) = −(|S¯ ′| + 1)
otherwise. It can be shown that the W -guessing entropy captures the g-
vulnerability of an adversary guided by the gain function gωbin , i.e., that
WNG1,WCER(ωbin , pS) = Vgωbin (pS). However, gωbin ranges over negative
values, which is not allowed by the original g-vulnerability framework.9
Fortunately we do not run into the same type of problem when using W -
vulnerability, worth of expectation under =, andW -probability of guessing
to provide operational interpretations for g-functions.
Other related work. Köpf and Basin [16] proposed the model for deterministic
systems we extended in this paper. Shannon [22] points out the independence
of the information contents with respect to its representation, and gives the
first steps in trying to understand how Shannon entropy would behave in a
lattice of partitions. The Lattice of Information is introduced by Landauer and
Redmond [14]. Yasuoka and Terauchi [17] show the equivalence of the ordering on
traditional measures, and Malacaria [10] uses the LoI as an algegraic foundation
to unify all these orderings. Backes, Köpf and Rybalchenko [23], and Heusser
and Malacaria [24] use model checkers and sat-solvers to determine the partitions
induced by deterministic programs. Adão et al. [25] relax the assumption of
perfect cryptography by allowing the adversary to infer a key at some (possibly
computational) cost, and introduce a quantitative extension of the usual Dolev-
Yao intruder model to analyze implementations of security protocols. Their work
focuses on cryptography, whereas ours is applied to QIF. Askarov et al. [26] show
that the possibly unbouded leakage of termination-insensitive noninterference
can be mitigated by making the secret sufficiently random and large. Demange
and Sands [27] point out that secrets can not always be chosen to fulfill such
requirements, and they develop a framework in which “small” secrets are handled
more carefully than “big” ones. They focus on preventing leakage, whereas we aim
at providing rigorous information-theoretic measures for quantifying leakage.
7 Conclusion and future work
This paper proposed a framework to incorporate the worth of structures—
possibly representing their sensitivity—into information-flow measures. We gen-
eralized Shannon entropy, guessing entropy and probability of guessing, and we
8 The procedure can be generalized to worth assignments other than ωbin .
9 If we try to capture W -guessing entropy using g-entropy instead of g-vulnerability,
the situation becomes even worse: no gain function exists, even with negative values.
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proved that the generalizations are consistent with respect to the Lattice of
Information for deterministic systems. We also outlined a design technique for
worth assignments that captures important aspects of a scenario of interest.
We are currently refining the design technique for worth assignments to make
it fully automated. We are also investigating scenarios where every attack incurs
some cost . The resulting theory would enable the study of the trade-off between
the information yielded by an attack versus cost.
Acknowledgments. The authors would like to thank Geoffrey Smith and San-
tosh S. Venkatesh for helpful discussions. Mário S. Alvim was a postdoctoral
research associate at the Mathematics Department of the University of Pennsyl-
vania when much of this research was performed. Support for Mário S. Alvim
and Andre Scedrov comes in part from the AFOSR MURI “Science of Cyber
Security: Modeling, Composition, and Measurement” as AFOSR grant FA9550-
11-1-0137. Additional support for Scedrov comes from NSF grant CNS-0830949
and from ONR grant N00014-11-1-0555. Fred Schneider is supported in part by
AFOSR grant F9550-06-0019, by the AFOSR MURI “Science of Cyber Security:
Modeling, Composition, and Measurement” as AFOSR grant FA9550-11-1-0137,
by NSF grants 0430161, 0964409, and CCF-0424422 (TRUST), by ONR grants
N00014-01-1-0968 and N00014-09-1-0652, and by grants from Microsoft.
References
1. Cachin, C.: Entropy Measures and Unconditional Security in Cryptography. PhD
thesis, ETH Zürich (1997) Reprint as vol. 1 of ETH Series in Information Security
and Cryptography, ISBN 3-89649-185-7, Hartung-Gorre Verlag, Konstanz, 1997.
2. Clark, D., Hunt, S., Malacaria, P.: Quantitative information flow, relations and
polymorphic types. J. of Logic and Computation 18(2) (2005) 181–199
3. Malacaria, P.: Assessing security threats of looping constructs. In Hofmann, M.,
Felleisen, M., eds.: Proceedings of the 34th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT Symposium
on Principles of Programming Languages, POPL 2007, ACM (2007) 225–235
4. Malacaria, P., Chen, H.: Lagrange multipliers and maximum information leakage
in different observational models. In: Proc. of the 2008 Workshop on Programming
Languages and Analysis for Security (PLAS 2008), ACM (June 2008) 135–146
5. Moskowitz, I.S., Newman, R.E., Syverson, P.F.: Quasi-anonymous channels. In:
Proc. of CNIS, IASTED (2003) 126–131
6. Moskowitz, I.S., Newman, R.E., Crepeau, D.P., Miller, A.R.: Covert channels and
anonymizing networks. In Jajodia, S., Samarati, P., Syverson, P.F., eds.: Workshop
on Privacy in the Electronic Society 2003, ACM (2003) 79–88
7. Chatzikokolakis, K., Palamidessi, C., Panangaden, P.: Anonymity protocols as
noisy channels. Inf. and Comp. 206(2–4) (2008) 378–401
8. Alvim, M.S., Andrés, M.E., Palamidessi, C.: Information Flow in Interactive Sys-
tems. In: Proceedings of the 21th International Conference on Concurrency Theory
(CONCUR 2010). Volume 6269 of LNCS., Springer (2010) 102–116
9. Massey: Guessing and entropy. In: Proceedings of the IEEE International Sympo-
sium on Information Theory, IEEE (1994) 204
19
10. Malacaria, P.: Algebraic foundations for information theoretical, probabilistic and
guessability measures of information flow. CoRR abs/1101.3453 (2011)
11. Smith, G.: On the foundations of quantitative information flow. In: Proceed-
ings of the 12th International Conference on Foundations of Software Science and
Computation Structure. (2009) 288–302
12. Braun, C., Chatzikokolakis, K., Palamidessi, C.: Quantitative notions of leakage for
one-try attacks. In: Proceedings of the 25th Conf. on Mathematical Foundations of
Programming Semantics. Volume 249 of Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer
Science., Elsevier B.V. (2009) 75–91
13. Alvim, M.S., Chatzikokolakis, K., Palamidessi, C., Smith, G.: Measuring informa-
tion leakage using generalized gain functions. In: Proceedings of the 25th IEEE
Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF). (2012) 265–279
14. Landauer, J., Redmond, T.: A lattice of information. In: Proc. Computer Security
Foundations Workshop VI. (June 1993) 65 –70
15. Sweeney, L.: Uniqueness of simple demographics in the u.s. population, Carnegie
Mellon University, Laboratory for International Data Privacy (2000)
16. Köpf, B., Basin, D.: Automatically deriving information-theoretic bounds for adap-
tive side-channel attacks. J. Comput. Secur. 19(1) (January 2011) 1–31
17. Yasuoka, H., Terauchi, T.: Quantitative information flow — verification hardness
and possibilities. In: Proc. 23nd IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium
(CSF ’10). (2010) 15–27
18. Dwork, C.: Differential privacy. In: Automata, Languages and Programming,
33rd Int. Colloquium, ICALP 2006, Venice, Italy, July 10-14, 2006, Proc., Part II.
Volume 4052 of LNCS., Springer (2006) 1–12
19. Ghosh, A., Roughgarden, T., Sundararajan, M.: Universally utility-maximizing
privacy mechanisms. In: Proceedings of the 41st annual ACM symposium on
Theory of computing. STOC ’09, New York, NY, USA, ACM (2009) 351–360
20. Alvim, M.S., Andrés, M.E., Chatzikokolakis, K., Palamidessi, C.: On the relation
between differential privacy and quantitative information flow. In: ICALP (2).
(2011) 60–76
21. Nakamura, Y.: Entropy and semivaluations on semilattices. Kodai Mathematical
Seminar Reports 22(4) (1970) 443–468
22. Shannon, C.: The lattice theory of information. Information Theory, Transactions
of the IRE Professional Group on 1(1) (February 1953) 105 –107
23. Backes, M., Köpf, B., Rybalchenko, A.: Automatic discovery and quantification of
information leaks. In: IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. (2009) 141–153
24. Heusser, J., Malacaria, P.: Quantifying information leaks in software. In: Proceed-
ings of the 26th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference. ACSAC ’10,
New York, NY, USA, ACM (2010) 261–269
25. Adão, P., Mateus, P., Viganò, L.: Protocol insecurity with a finite number of ses-
sions and a cost-sensitive guessing intruder is np-complete. Theoretical Computer
Science (0) (2013) http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2013.09.015.
26. Askarov, A., Hunt, S., Sabelfeld, A., Sands, D.: Termination-insensitive noninter-
ference leaks more than just a bit. In: Proceedings of the 13th European Sympo-
sium on Research in Computer Security, Springer-Verlag (2008) 333–348
27. Demange, D., Sands, D.: All secrets great and small. In: Proceedings of the 18th
European Symposium on Programming Languages and Systems. ESOP ’09, Berlin,
Heidelberg, Springer-Verlag (2009) 207–221
20
Appendix A: Proofs
A.I Definitions and conventions
For some of our results we need a particular type of worth assignment called
F-roofed, in which every proper sub-structure has a strictly smaller worth than
the entire secret. That means that there is no redundancy in the collection of
fields composing the secret.
Definition 10 (F-roofed worth assignment). Given a set of fields F , a
worth assignment ω : P(F) → R is said to be F -roofed if for every structure
f ⊂ F , ω(f) < ω(F).
The following theorem states the results of Yasuoka and Terauchi [17] and of
Malacaria [10] using terminology in our paper. This theorem shows that showed
the orders on probability of guessing, guessing entropy, and Shannon entropy,
and the order on the LoI all coincide.
Theorem 4 ( [10,17]). Let S be a set with probability distribution pS. For any
two partitions P and P′ on S, the following are equivalent:
P ⊑P′ (18)
∀pS SE(pS|P) ≥SE(pS|P
′) (19)
∀n ≥ 1 ∀pS PGn(pS |P) ≤PGn(pS |P
′) (20)
∀pS NG(pS |P) ≥NG(pS |P
′) (21)
A.II Main results
Theorem 1. Let S be a set of secrets composed by the fields in F and let Ca be
an attack. Let ν be a W -measure that is monotonic with respect to observations,
n ≥ 0 be the number of guesses allowed for the adversary, and 0 ≤ w ≤ ω(F).
For every distribution pS on S and every worth assignment ω:
WCER(ω, pS , Ca) ≥WCER(ω, pS) (1)
WV (ω, pS , Ca) ≥WV (ω, pS) (2)
WEXP=n,ν(ω, pS , Ca) ≥WEXP
=
n,ν(ω, pS) (3)
WNGw,ν(ω, pS , Ca) ≤WNGw,ν(ω, pS) (4)
WSEw,ν(ω, pS , Ca) ≤WSEw,ν(ω, pS) (5)
WPG∈
w,n,ν(ω, pS , Ca) ≥WPG
∈
w,n,ν(ω, pS) (6)
Proof. It follows from Propositions 5, 7, 10, 13, 16, and 19.
Theorem 2. Let S be a set of secrets distributed according to pS, and let Ca be
an attack. Then the following hold:
SE(pS , Ca) =WSE1,WCER(ωbin , pS , Ca) (7)
NG(pS , Ca) =WNG1,WCER(ωbin , pS , Ca) (8)
PGn(pS , Ca) =WEXP
=
n,νnull
(ωbin , pS , Ca) (∀n ≥ 0) (9)
V (pS |Ca) =WV (ωbin , pS , Ca) (10)
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where νnull is a W -measure such that νnull (ω, pS) = 0 for every ω and pS.
Proof. It follows from Propositions 9, 12, 15, 18, and 21.
Theorem 3. Let S be a set of secrets composed by the fields in F . For all P
and P′ in the LoI for S, the following are equivalent:
P ⊑P′ (11)
∀ω ∀pS WCER(ω, pS,P) ≤WCER(ω, pS,P
′) (12)
∀ω ∀pSWV (ω, pS,P) ≤WV (ω, pS ,P
′) (13)
∀n ∀ν ∀ω ∀pS WEXP
=
n,ν(ω, pS,P) ≤WEXP
=
n,ν(ω, pS ,P
′) (14)
∀w ∀ν ∀ω ∀pS WNGw,ν(ω, pS,P) ≥WNGw,ν(ω, pS ,P
′) (15)
∀w ∀ν ∀ω ∀pS WSEw,ν(ω, pS,P) ≥WSEw,ν(ω, pS ,P
′) (16)
∀w ∀n ∀ν ∀ω ∀pSWPG
∈
w,n,ν(ω, pS,P) ≤WPG
∈
w,n,ν(ω, pS,P
′) (17)
where n ≥ 0; 0 ≤ w ≤ ω(f), and ν ranges over all composable W -measures
that are consistent with respect to the LoI plus the worth of certainty measure
WCER. In (15) and (16) ν is restricted to be monotonic with respect to blocks.
Proof. It follows from Propositions 6, 8, 11, 14, 17, and 20.
A.III Results regarding probability of guessing under ∈
Proposition 3. Let S be a set of secrets and Ca be an attack. For every distri-
bution pS on S and every n ≥ 0 the following holds.
PG∈n(pS , Ca) ≥ PG
∈
n(pS)
Proof. By definition:
PG∈n(pS , Ca) =
∑
o∈O
pa(o) max
P∈LoI(S)
|P|≤2n
∑
S′∈P
|S′|=1
pS(S
′|o)
≥ max
P∈LoI(S)
|P|≤2n
∑
o∈O
pa(o)
∑
S′∈P
|S′|=1
pS(S
′|o)
= max
P∈LoI(S)
|P|≤2n
∑
S′∈P
|S′|=1
pS(S
′)
=PG∈n(pS)
⊓⊔
Proposition 4. Let S be a set of secrets composed by the fields in F . Then for
every two partitions P and P′ in the LoI of S the following holds:
P ⊑ P′ ⇔ ∀n ∀pSPG∈n(pS ,P) ≤ PG
∈
n(pS ,P
′)
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Proof. 1. (⇒) By definition, PG∈n(pS ,P) is given by:∑
So∈P
pS(So) max
P
∗∈LoI(S)
|P∗|≤2n
∑
S∗∈P∗
|S∗|=1
pS(S
∗|So) (22)
Since each block of P is split into blocks of P′, (22) can be rewritten as:
∑
So∈P
∑
So′∈P′So′So
pS(So′) max
P
∗∈LoI(S)
|P∗|≤2n
∑
S∗∈P∗
|S∗|=1
pS(S
∗|So) (23)
Because So′ ⊆ So, pS(S∗|So′) ≥ pS(S∗|So), and (23) must be greater or
equal than:
∑
So∈P
∑
So′∈P′So′So
pS(So′) max
P
∗∈LoI(S)
|P∗|≤2n
∑
S∗∈P∗
|S∗|=1
pS(S
∗|So′) (24)
Grouping the summations in (24), we obtain:
∑
So′∈P′
pS(So′) max
P
∗∈LoI(S)
|P∗|≤2n
∑
S∗∈P∗
|S∗|=1
pS(S
∗|So′) (25)
And noting that (25) is the definition of PG∈n(pS ,P
′) concludes the proof.
2. (⇐) We reason by counter-positive and show that if P 6⊑ P′, then there
exists a probability distribution pS on secrets and a value n ≥ 0 that make
PG∈n(pS ,P
′) < PG∈n(pS ,P).
If P 6⊑ P′, then there exist two secrets s1, s2 that are in the same block of
partition P′, but in different blocks in partition P. Take pS to be the distribu-
tion on secrets that is zero in every secret with exception of pS(s1) > 0 and
pS(s2) > 0. Then there are only two blocks in P with non-zero probability,
one block S1 containing s1 and the other one S2 containing s2. Let us pick
n = 0, and calculate PG∈0 (pS ,P
′) to be:
pS(S1) max
P
∗∈LoI(S)
|P∗|≤1
∑
S∗∈P∗
|S∗|=1
pS(S
∗|S1) + pS(S2) max
P
∗∈LoI(S)
|P∗|≤1
∑
S∗∈P∗
|S∗|=1
pS(S
∗|S2) (26)
On the right-hand side of (26), in order to satisfy the maximizations the
partition P∗ must have at most one block, i.e., the sets S1 and S2 are not split.
But because both S1 and S2 are singletons, they will satisfy the condition
for the summations, and hence (26) becomes simply:
pS(S1) + pS(S2) =
1 (27)
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On the other hand, the partition P′ must have a single block S3 containing
both s1 and s2. So PG
∈
0 (pS ,P
′) is given by:
pS(S3) max
P
∗∈LoI(S)
|P∗|≤1
∑
S∗∈P∗
|S∗|=1
pS(S
∗|S3) (28)
Again, in (28) the partition P∗ must have at most one block, meaning that
the set S3 cannot be split. This implies that the only block S∗ ∈ P∗ will have
size 2, so the summation ine˜qrefeq:pgalt-loi-7 is actually zero. Comparing
that to (27), we conclude that for the particular pS and n we constructed it
is the case that PG∈n(pS ,P
′) < PG∈n(pS ,P).
⊓⊔
A.IV Results regarding worth of certainty
Lemma 1. Let S be a set of secrets composed by the fields in F and distributed
according to pS, and let Ca be an attack with observables in O. Then for all
o ∈ O:
supp(pS(·|o)) ⊆ supp(pS)
Proof. If s ∈ S is in the support of pS(·|o), then pS(s|o) =
pS(s)Ca(s,o)
pa(o)
> 0.
Hence it must be the case that also pS(s) > 0, and s ∈ supp(pS). ⊓⊔
Lemma 2. Let S be a set of secrets composed by the fields in F , and let p′S, p
′′
S
be two probability distributions on S. Then:
supp(p′S) ⊆ supp(p
′′
S) =⇒ ded(p
′′
S) ⊆ ded(p
′
S)
Proof. By definition of deducible fields, f ∈ ded(p′′S) if there is no pair of secrets
s′, s′′ ∈ supp(p′′S) such that s
′[f ] 6= s′′[f ]. It is easy to see that if supp(p′S) ⊆
supp(p′′S), no such a pair of secrets belong to supp(p
′
S) either, and therefore
f ∈ ded(p′S). ⊓⊔
Proposition 5. Let S be a set of secrets composed by the fields in F and Ca
be an attack. For every distribution pS on S and every worth assignment ω, the
following holds.
WCER(ω, pS , Ca) ≥WCER(ω, pS)
Proof. By Lemma 1, for every o ∈ O, supp(pS(·|o)) ⊆ supp(pS). That means, by
Lemma 2, that ded(pS(·|o)) ≥ ded(ω(pS)). Because of the monotonicity of worth
assignment ω, it follows that for every o ∈ O, ω(ded(pS(·|o))) ≥ ω(ded(ω(pS))).
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Using this fact in the definition of worth of certainty:
WCER(ω, pS , Ca) =
∑
o∈O
pa(o)ω(ded(pS(·|o)))
≥
∑
o∈O
pa(o)ω(ded(pS))
=ω(ded(pS))
∑
o∈O
pa(o)
=ω(ded(pS))
=WCER(ω, pS)
⊓⊔
Proposition 6. Let S be a set of secrets composed by the fields in F . For every
two partitions P and P′ in the LoI of S the following holds:
P ⊑ P′ ⇔ ∀ω ∀pSWCER(ω, pS,P) ≤WCER(ω, pS ,P′)
Proof. 1. (⇒) By definition, the value of WCER(ω, pS ,P) is given by:∑
So∈P
pa(So)WCER(ω, pa(·|So)) (29)
Since each block of P is split into blocks of P′, (29) can be rewritten as:
∑
So∈P

 ∑
So′∈P′
p(So′ |So)

 pa(So)WCER(ω, pa(·|So)) =
∑
S
o′
∈P′
∑
So∈P
p(So′ ,So)WCER(ω, pa(·|So)) (30)
Noting that supp(p(·|So′ ,So)) ⊆ supp(p(·|So′)), we can use Lemma 2 to
deduce that
WCER(ω, pa(·|So)) ≤WCER(ω, pa(·|So′ ,So))
=WCER(ω, pa(·|So′)) (31)
where the equality follows because P′ is a refinement of P and therefore
p(·|So′ ,So) = p(·|So′). Using (31), we deduce that (30) must be smaller or
equal than: ∑
So′∈P′
∑
So∈P
p(So′ ,So)WCER(ω, pa(·|So′)) =
∑
So′∈P′
p(So′)WCER(ω, pa(·|So′)) =
WCER(ω,P′)
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2. (⇐) We reason by counter-positive and show that if P 6⊑ P′, then there exists
a probability distribution pS on secrets and a worth assignment ω that make
WCER(ω, pS,P
′) < WCER(ω, pS ,P).
If P 6⊑ P′, then there exist two secrets s1, s2 that are in the same block of
partition P′, but in different blocks in partition P. Take pS to be the distribu-
tion on secrets that is zero in every secret with exception of pS(s1) > 0 and
pS(s2) > 0. Then there are only two blocks in P with non-zero probability,
one block S1 containing s1 and the other one S2 containing s2. Noting that
ded(pS(·|S1)) = ded(pS(·|S2)) = F , we can calculate:
WCER(ω, pS ,P) =p(S1)ω(ded(pS(·|S1))) + p(S2)ω(ded(pS(·|S2)))
=p(S1)ω(F) + p(S2)ω(F)
=ω(F)
On the other hand, the partition P′ must have a single block S3 containing
both s1 and s2. Note that since s1 6= s2, they must differ in at least one field,
and therefore ded(pS(·|S3)) is a proper subset of F . By choosing a F -roofed
worth assignment ω, we have that ω(ded(pS(·|S3))) < ω(F) and consequently
for the particular pS we constructed it is the case that WCER(ω, pS,P
′) <
WCER(ω, pS,P).
⊓⊔
A.V Results regarding W -vulnerability
Lemma 3. Let S be a set of secrets composed by the fields in F , distributed
according to pS, and let P and P
′ be partitions in the LoI of S such that P ⊑ P′.
Then, for every block So of secrets belonging to partition P the following holds:∑
S
o′
∈P′
p(So′ |So)pS(f|So′) ≥ pS(f|So)
Proof. ∑
So′∈P′
p(So′ |So)pS(f|So′) =
∑
So′∈P′
p(So′ |So) max
x∈S[f]
∑
s∈S
s[f]=x
pS(s|So′)
=
∑
So′∈P′So′⊆So
p(So′)
p(So)
max
x∈S[f]
∑
s∈So′
s[f]=x
pS(s)
p(So′)
≥ max
x∈S[f]
∑
S
o′
∈P′
So′⊆So
∑
s∈So′
s[f]=x
pS(s)
p(So)
= max
x∈S[f]
∑
s∈So
s[f]=x
pS(s)
p(So)
=pS(f|So)
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⊓⊔
Proposition 7. Let S be a set of secrets composed by the fields in F and Ca
be an attack. For every distribution pS on S and every worth assignment ω, the
following holds.
WV (ω, pS , Ca) ≥WV (ω, pS)
Proof. By definition of W -vulnerability, WV (ω, pS , Ca) is given by:∑
o∈O
pa(o)max
f⊆F
(pS(f|o)ω(f)) (32)
By taking the max out of the summation, and then applying the definition of
pS(f|o), we make (32) greater or equal than:
max
f⊆F
ω(f)
∑
o∈O
pa(o)pS(f|o) =
max
f⊆F
ω(f)
∑
o∈O
pa(o) max
x∈S[f]
∑
s∈S
s[f]=x
pS(s|o) (33)
Again taking the max out of the summation makes (33) greater or equal than:
max
f⊆F
ω(f) max
x∈S[f]
∑
s∈S
s[f]=x
∑
o∈O
pS(s, o) =
max
f⊆F
ω(f) max
x∈S[f]
∑
s∈S
s[f]=x
pS(s) (34)
And noting that (34) is exactly the definition of WV (ω, pS) concludes the proof.
⊓⊔
Proposition 8. Let S be a set of secrets composed by the fields in F . For every
two partitions P and P′ in the LoI of S the following holds:
P ⊑ P′ ⇔ ∀ω ∀pSWV (ω, pS,P) ≤WV (ω, pS ,P′)
Proof. 1. (⇒) By definition, the value of WV (ω, pS,P) is given by:∑
So∈P
pa(So)WV (ω, pa(·|So)) (35)
Since each block of P is split into blocks of P′, and by applying the definition
of pS(f|o), (35) can be rewritten as:
∑
So∈P

 ∑
So′∈P′
p(So′ |So)

max
f⊆F
(pS(f|So)ω(f)) (36)
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By taking the max out of the summation, we infer that (36) must be greater
or equal than:
∑
So∈P
max
f⊆F
ω(f)
∑
S
o′
∈P′
p(So′ |So)pS(f|So) (37)
Using Lemma 3, (37) is greater or equal than:
∑
So∈P
max
f⊆F
ω(f)pS(f|So) (38)
And noting that (38) is the definition of WV (ω, pS) concludes the proof.
2. (⇐) We reason by counter-positive and show that if P 6⊑ P′, then there exists
a probability distribution pS on secrets and a worth assignment ω that make
WV (ω, pS ,P
′) < WV (ω, pS ,P). If P 6⊑ P′, then there exist two secrets s1, s2
that are in the same block of partition P′, but in different blocks in partition
P. Take pS to be the distribution on secrets that is zero in every secret with
exception of pS(s1) > 0 and pS(s2) > 0. Then there are only two blocks in
P with non-zero probability, one block S1 containing s1 and the other one
S2 containing s2. We can then calculate:
WV (ω, pS ,P) = pS(S1)max
f⊆F
pS(f|S1)ω(f) + pS(S2)max
f⊆F
pS(f|S2)ω(f) (39)
Since S1 and S2 have one non-zero element each, both maximizations are
realized on f = F , which makes pS(f|S1) = pS(f|S2) = 1. Therefore (39)
becomes:
WV (ω, pS ,P) =pS(S1) · 1 · ω(F) + pS(S2) · 1 · ω(F)
=ω(F) (40)
On the other hand, the partition P′ must have a single block S3 containing
both s1 and s2. We then derive:
WV (ω, pS,P
′) =pS(S3)max
f⊆F
pS(f|S3)ω(f)
=max
f⊆F
pS(f|S3)ω(f) (41)
=pS(f
∗|S3)ω(f∗) (42)
where (41) follows because pS(S3) = 1, and in (41) f∗ is the argmax . To
conclude the proof, we show that (40) > (42), since we have found some
pS(·) that makes WV (ω, pS ,P) > WV (ω, pS ,P′). Let us choose an F -roofed
worth assignment ω and analyze the two possible cases:
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i. In the case f∗ = F , we have:
WV (ω, pS,P
′) =pS(F|S3)ω(F)
=ω(F)
1
pS(S3)
max
x∈S[F ]
∑
s∈S3
s[F ]=x
pS(s)
=ω(F) max
x∈S[F ]
∑
s∈S3
s[F ]=x
pS(s) (43)
But note that since s1 6= s2, it is impossible that s1[F ] = s2[F ]. There-
fore at least one among s1 and s2 does not satisfy the condition on the
summation in (43), and its result is necessarily smaller than 1. Hence
WV (ω, pS,P
′) < ω(F)
ii. In the case f∗ ⊂ F , we have:
WV (ω, pS ,P
′) =pS(f∗|S3)ω(f∗)
≤1 · ω(f∗) (44)
<ω(F) (45)
where (44) follows because for every f∗ it is the case that pS(f∗|S3) ≤ 1,
and (45) follows because ω is F -roofed.
⊓⊔
Proposition 9. Let S be a set of secrets distributed according to pS, and Ca be
an attack. Then the following holds:
V (pS , Ca) =WV (ωbin , pS , Ca)
Proof. By definition:
WV (ωbin , pS) =max
f⊆F
(pS(f)ωbin(f))
=pS(F) (46)
= max
x∈S[F ]
∑
s∈S
s[F ]=x
pS(s) (47)
where (46) follows because ωbin(f) > 0 only for f = F , and in (47) we apply the
definition of pS(F). Since finding an element such that s[F ] = x is the same as
finding the (unique) element s = x itself, (47) can be rewritten as follows:
WV (ωbin , pS) =max
s∈S
pS(s)
=V (pS) (48)
From (48), and from Definition 3, for every Ca it follows immediately that
V (pS , Ca) = WV (ωbin , pS , Ca). ⊓⊔
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A.VI Results regarding worth of expectation under =
Lemma 4. Let S be a set of secrets composed by the fields in F , and let ν
be a composable measure of information worth consistent with respect to the
LoI. Then for every probability distribution pS on secrets, and for any sets
X ,Y1, . . . ,Yn ⊆ S such that X =
⋃n
i=1 Yi and
⋂n
i=1 Yi = ∅:
pS(X )ν(ω, pS(·|X ),X ) ≤
n∑
i=1
pS(Yi)ν(ω, pS(·|Yi),Yi)
Proof. Consider the probability distribution pS(·|X ). Since for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n
we have Yi ⊆ X , it follows that pS(Yi|X ) =
pS(Yi)
pS(X ) , and pS(s|X ) = 0 for any
s /∈ X . Consider now partitions P,P′ such that every block in P is exactly the
same as every block in P′, with the exception that X is a block in P and the
corresponding blocks on P′ are Yi, . . . ,Yn. Note that, by construction, P ⊑ P′.
We can derive:
ν(ω, pS(·|X ),P) = ν(ω, pS(·|X ),X ) (49)
On the other hand:
ν(ω, pS(·|X ),P
′) =
n∑
i=1
pS(Yi|X )ν(ω, pS(·|Yi),Yi) (50)
Since ν is consistent with respect to the LoI, for every distribution p′(·) on
secrets it is the case that ν(ω, p′(·),P) ≤ ν(ω, p′(·),P′). In particular, that is true
for the probability distribution pS(·|X ). Then we can compare (49) and (50) as
follows:
ν(ω, pS(·|X ),X ) ≤
n∑
i=1
pS(Yi|X )ν(ω, pS(·|Yi),Yi)
=
1
pS(X )
n∑
i=1
pS(Yi)ν(ω, pS(·|Yi),Yi)
From which the proposition follows immediately. ⊓⊔
Proposition 10. Let S be a set of secrets composed by the fields in F and Ca
be an attack. Let ν be a (valid) composable W -measure, and n ≥ 0 be the number
of guesses allowed for the adversary. For every distribution pS on S and every
worth assignment ω the following holds.
WEXP=n,ν(ω, pS , Ca) ≥WEXP
=
n,ν(ω, pS)
Proof. By definition of worth of expectation under =, WEXP=n,ν(ω, pS , Ca) is
given by: ∑
o∈O
pa(o) max
S′⊆S
|S′|≤n
(
pS(S
′|o)ω(F) + pS(S¯ ′|o)ν(ω, pS(·|S¯ ′, o))
)
(51)
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By taking the max out of the summation, we make (51) greater or equal than:
max
S′⊆S
|S′|≤n
∑
o∈O
pa(o)
(
pS(S
′|o)ω(F) + pS(S¯ ′|o)ν(ω, pS(·|S¯ ′, o))
)
=
max
S′⊆S
|S′|≤n
(
pS(S
′)ω(F) + pS(S¯ ′)
∑
o∈O
pa(o|S¯ ′)ν(ω, pS(·|S¯ ′, o))
)
(52)
By hypothesis, ν is a composable measure, and hence (52) can be rewritten as:
max
S′⊆S
|S′|≤n
(
pS(S
′)ω(F) + pS(S¯ ′)ν(ω, pS(·|S¯ ′), Ca)
)
(53)
Because ν is a valid measure, ν(ω, pS(·|S¯ ′), Ca) ≥ ν(ω, pS(·|S¯ ′)) and hence (53)
is greater or equal than:
max
S′⊆S
|S′|≤n
(
pS(S
′)ω(F) + pS(S¯ ′)ν(ω, pS(·|S¯ ′))
)
(54)
And noting that (54) is exactly the definition of WEXP=n,ν(ω, pS) concludes the
proof. ⊓⊔
Proposition 11. Let S be a set of secrets composed by the fields in F . For every
two partitions P and P′ in the LoI of S the following holds:
P ⊑ P′ ⇔ ∀n ∀ν ∀ω ∀pSWEXP=n,ν(ω, pS,P) ≤WEXP
=
n,ν(ω, pS ,P
′)
where n ≥ 0 and ν is any composable W -measure consistent with respect to the
LoI.
Proof.
1. (⇒) It is enough to consider one block So in the partition P that is split into
blocks So′ and So′′ in partition P′. Let us derive the value of:
WEXP=n,ν(ω, pS(·|So),So) (55)
Using the definition of worth of expectation under =, (55) can be rewritten
as:
max
X⊆So
|X |≤n
(
pS(X|So)ω(F) + pS(X¯ |So)ν(ω, pS(·|X¯ ), X¯ )
)
(56)
where X¯ = So\X .
Calling Xo the subset of X that realizes the maximization, (56) can be rewrit-
ten as:
pS(Xo|So)ω(F) + pS(X¯o|So)ν(ω, pS(·|X¯o), X¯o) (57)
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where X¯o = So\Xo.
Let Xo′ and Xo′′ be the projection of Xo onto So′ and So′′ , respectively. Sim-
ilarly, let X¯o′ and X¯o′′ be the projection of X¯o onto So′ and So′′ , respectively.
Then we can split the summations and (57) becomes:
pS(Xo′ |So)ω(F) + pS(Xo′′ |So)ω(F)+
+pS(X¯o′ ∪ X¯o′′ |So)ν(ω, pS(·|X¯o′ ∪ X¯o′′), X¯o′ ∪ X¯o′′)
(58)
Let us call n∗ ≤ n the number that maximizes WEXP=n,ν(ω, pS(·|So),So)
together with Xo. Now we explicit an arbritary subset X¯no′ ∈ X¯o′ such that
X¯no′ = n
∗−|Xo′ |. Note that it is always possible because Xo′ ⊆ Xo and |Xo| =
n∗. We proceed similarly for a set X¯no′′ ∈ X¯o′′ such that X¯
n
o′′ = n
∗ − |Xo′′ |.
Then we can rewrite X¯o′ ∪ X¯o′′ as X¯no′ ∪ X¯o′\X¯
n
o′ ∪ X¯
n
o′′ ∪ X¯o′′\X¯
n
o′′ . Since ν is
a composable measure that is consistent with respect to LoI (or the worth of
certainty measure), we can use Lemma 4 to split pS(X¯o′∪X¯o′′)ν(ω, pS(·|X¯o′∪
X¯o′′), X¯o′ ∪ X¯o′′) and we can deduce that (58) is smaller or equal than the
following:
pS(Xo′ |So)ω(F) + pS(Xo′′ |So)ω(F)+
+pS(X¯
n
o′ |So)ν(ω, pS(·|X¯o′), X¯o′)+
+pS(X¯o′\X¯
n
o′ |So)ν(ω, pS(·|X¯o′\X¯
n
o′), X¯o′\X¯
n
o′)+
+pS(X¯
n
o′′ |So)ν(ω, pS(·|X¯o′′), X¯o′′)+
+pS(X¯o′′\X¯
n
o′′ |So)ν(ω, pS(·|X¯o′′\X¯
n
o′′), X¯o′′\X¯
n
o′′)
(59)
But ν(ω, pS(·|X¯o′), X¯o′) ≤ ω(F), and ν(ω, pS(·|X¯o′′), X¯o′′) ≤ ω(F). Hence
(59) is smaller or equal than the following:
pS(Xo′ |So)ω(F) + pS(Xo′′ |So)ω(F)+
+pS(X¯
n
o′ |So)ω(F)+
+pS(X¯o′\X¯
n
o′ |So)ν(ω, pS(·|X¯o′\X¯
n
o′), X¯o′\X¯
n
o′)+
+pS(X¯
n
o′′ |So)ω(F)+
+pS(X¯o′′\X¯
n
o′′ |So)ν(ω, pS(·|X¯o′′\X¯
n
o′′), X¯o′′\X¯
n
o′′)
(60)
Regrouping the summations, (60) can be rewritten as:
pS(Xo′ ∪ X¯
n
o′ |So)ω(F) + pS(Xo′′ ∪ X¯
n
o′′ |So)ω(F)+
+pS(X¯o′\X¯
n
o′ |So)ν(ω, pS(·|X¯o′\X¯
n
o′), X¯o′\X¯
n
o′)+
+pS(X¯o′′\X¯
n
o′′ |So)ν(ω, pS(·|X¯o′′\X¯
n
o′′), X¯o′′\X¯
n
o′′)
(61)
Let us call Xo′ ∪X¯no′ = Y1 and Xo′′ ∪X¯
n
o′′ = Y2. It follows that X¯o′\X¯
n
o′ = Y¯1,
and that X¯o′′\X¯no′′ = Y¯2. Hence (61) can be rewritten as:
pS(Y1|So)ω(F) + pS(Y¯1|So)ν(ω, pS(·|Y¯1), Y¯1)+
+pS(Y2|So)ω(F) + pS(Y¯2|So)ν(ω, pS(·|Y¯2), Y¯2)
(62)
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Manipulating the probabilities, (62) becomes:
pS(Y1)
pS(So)
·
pS(So′)
pS(So′)
ω(F) +
pS(Y¯1)
pS(So)
·
pS(So′)
pS(So′)
ν(ω, pS(·|Y¯1), Y¯1)+
+
pS(Y2)
pS(So)
·
pS(So′′)
pS(So′′)
ω(F) +
pS(Y¯2)
pS(So)
·
pS(So′′ )
pS(So′′ )
ν(ω, pS(·|Y¯2), Y¯2)
(63)
From simple calculations, (63) becomes:
pS(So′)
pS(So)
(
pS(Y1|So′)ω(F) + pS(Y¯1|So′)ν(ω, pS(·|Y¯1), Y¯1)
)
+
+
pS(So′′)
pS(So)
(
pS(Y2|So′′)ω(F) + pS(Y¯2|So′)ν(ω, pS(·|Y¯2), Y¯2)
) (64)
Note that, by construction, |Y1| ≤ n∗ and |Y2| ≤ n∗. And since n∗ ≤ n, we
can take the maximum over any set of size at most n and find that (64) is
smaller or equal than the following:
pS(So′)
pS(So)
max
Y∈So′
|Y|≤n
(
pS(Y|So′)ω(F) + pS(Y¯|So′)ν(ω, pS(·|Y¯), Y¯)
)
+
+
pS(So′′)
pS(So)
max
Y∈S
o′′
|Y|≤n
(
pS(Y|So′′ )ω(F) + pS(Y¯|So′′)ν(ω, pS(·|Y¯), Y¯)
) (65)
Using the definition of worth of expectation under =, (65) can be rewritten
as:
pS(So′)
pS(So)
WEXP=n,ν(ω, pS(·|So′),So′)+
+
pS(So′′)
pS(So)
WEXP=n,ν(ω, pS(·|So′′),So′′)
(66)
Comparing (55) and (66):
pS(So)WEXP
=
n,ν(ω, pS(·|So),So) ≤ pS(So′)WEXP
=
n,ν(ω, pS(·|So′),So′)+
+pS(So′′ )WEXP
=
n,ν(ω, pS(·|So′′ ),So′′)
(67)
And since worth of expectation under = is a composable measure, from (67)
we conclude that by splitting blocks one can never decrease the worth of
expectation under = of the partition.
2. (⇐) We reason by counter-positive and show that if P 6⊑ P′, then there
exists a probability distribution pS on secrets and aW -measure ν that makes
WEXP=n,ν(ω, pS ,P
′) < WEXP=n,ν(ω, pS ,P). By Proposition 12, PGn(pS ,P)
is a special case of WEXP=ν,n(ω, pS ,P) for some ν and ω, so we can use as
our counter-example the same probability distribution used in Theorem 4 to
prove that PGn is consistent with respect to the LoI.
⊓⊔
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Proposition 12. Let S be a set of secrets distributed according to pS, and Ca
be an attack. Then the following holds for all n ≥ 0:
PGn(pS , Ca) =WEXP
=
n,νnull
(ωbin , pS , Ca)
where νnull is the null W -measure such that νnull (ω, pS) = 0 for every ω and
pS.
Proof. By definition, the value of WEXP=n,νnull (ωbin , pS) is given by:
max
S′⊆S
|S′|≤n
(
pS(S
′)ωbin(F) + pS(S¯ ′)νnull (ω, pS(·|S¯ ′))
)
(68)
Using the definitions of ωbin and νnull , (68) reduces to:
max
S′⊆S
|S′|≤n
(
pS(S
′) · 1 + pS(S¯ ′) · 0
)
=
max
S′⊆S
|S′|≤n
(pS(S
′)) (69)
But (69) is the definition of the probability of guessing PGn(pS). From this,
and from Definition 4, for every Ca it follows immediately that PGn(pS , Ca) =
WEXP=n,νnull (ωbin , pS, Ca). ⊓⊔
A.VII Results regarding W -guessing entropy
Proposition 13. Let S be a set of secrets composed by the fields in F and Ca
be an attack. Let ν be a W -measure that is monotonic for observations, and
0 ≤ w ≤ ω(F). For every distribution pS on S and every worth assignment ω
the following holds.
WNGw,ν(ω, pS , Ca) ≤WNGw,ν(ω, pS)
Proof. By definition of W -guessing entropy, WNGw,ν(ω, pS, Ca) is given by:
∑
o∈O
pa(o) min
S′⊆S
ν(ω,pS(·|S′,o))≥w
(
pS(S¯ ′|o)NG(pS(·|S¯ ′, o)) + pS(S ′|o)(|S¯ ′|+ 1)
)
(70)
Because ν is monotonic for observations, for every o′ ∈ O it is the case that
ν(ω, pS(·|S ′, o)) ≥ ν(ω, pS(·|S ′)), so we can take the max out of the summation
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to deduce that (70) must be smaller or equal than:
min
S′⊆S
ν(ω,pS(·|S′))≥w
∑
o∈O
pa(o)
(
pS(S¯ ′|o)NG(pS(·|S¯ ′, o)) + pS(S ′|o)(|S¯ ′|+ 1)
)
=
min
S′⊆S
ν(ω,pS(·|S′))≥w
(
pS(S¯ ′)
(∑
o∈O
pa(o|S¯ ′)NG(pS(·|S¯ ′, o))
)
+
+ pS(S
′)(|S¯ ′|+ 1)
∑
o∈O
pa(o|S
′)
)
=
min
S′⊆S
ν(ω,pS(·|S′))≥w
(
pS(S¯ ′)NG(pS(·|S¯ ′, Ca)) + pS(S ′)(|S¯ ′|+ 1)
)
(71)
It is well known that posterior guessing entropy is always smaller than prior
guessing entropy, so for every Ca, NG(pS(·|S¯ ′, Ca)) ≤ NG(pS(·|S¯ ′)) and (71)
must be smaller or equal than:
min
S′⊆S
ν(ω,pS(·|S′))≥w
(
pS(S¯ ′)NG(pS(·|S¯ ′)) + pS(S ′)(|S¯ ′|+ 1)
)
(72)
And noting that (72) is exactly the definition of WNGw,ν(ω, pS) concludes the
proof. ⊓⊔
Proposition 14. Let S be a set of secrets composed by the fields in F . Then
for every two partitions P and P′ in the LoI of S the following holds:
P ⊑ P′ ⇔ ∀w ∀ν ∀ω ∀pSWNGw,ν(ω, pS,P) ≥WNGw,ν(ω, pS ,P′)
where 0 ≤ w ≤ ω(f), and ν is any composable W -measure that is monotonic
with respect to blocks.
Proof. 1. (⇒) It is enough to consider one block So in the partition P that is
split into blocks So′ and So′′ in partition P′. Let us derive the value of:
WNGν,w(ω, pS(·|So),So) (73)
Using the definition of W -guessing entropy, (73) can be rewritten as:
min
X⊆So
ν(ω,pS(·|X ),X )≥w
(
pS(X¯ |So)NG(pS(·|X¯ )) + pS(X|So)(|X¯ |+ 1)
)
(74)
Calling Xo the set that realizes the minimization, (74) can be rewritten as:
pS(X¯o|So)NG(pS(·|X¯o)) + pS(Xo|So)(|X¯o|+ 1) (75)
Let Xo′ and Xo′′ be the projection of Xo onto So′ and So′′ , respectively. Sim-
ilarly, let X¯o′ and X¯o′′ be the projection of X¯o onto So′ and So′′ , respectively.
Then (75) becomes:
pS(X¯o′ ∪ X¯o′′ |So)NG(pS(·|X¯o′ ∪ X¯o′′))+
+pS(Xo′ ∪ Xo′′ |So)(|X¯o′ ∪ X¯o′′ |+ 1)
(76)
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By Proposition 15 and 4, NG is a composable W -measure consistent with
respect to LoI, so we can use Lemma 4 (taking the necessary care of inverting
the inequality) to split pS(X¯o′ ∪ X¯o′′ |So)NG(pS(·|X¯o′ ∪ X¯o′′)). So (76) is
greater or equal than the following:
pS(X¯o′ |So)NG(pS(·|X¯o′)) + pS(X¯o′′ |So)NG(pS(·|X¯o′′ ))+
+pS(Xo′ ∪ Xo′′ |So)(|X¯o′ ∪ X¯o′′ |+ 1)
(77)
Since Xo′ and Xo′′ are non-overlapping, (77) can be rewritten as:
pS(X¯o′ |So)NG(pS(·|X¯o′)) + pS(X¯o′′ |So)NG(pS(·|X¯o′′))+
+pS(Xo′ |So)(|X¯o′ ∪ X¯o′′ |+ 1) + pS(Xo′′ |So)(|X¯o′ ∪ X¯o′′ |+ 1)
(78)
Using the properties for the size of unions of sets, (78) is greater or equal
than the following:
pS(X¯o′ |So)NG(pS(·|X¯o′)) + pS(X¯o′′ |So)NG(pS(·|X¯o′′ ))+
+pS(Xo′ |So)(|X¯o′ |+ 1) + pS(Xo′′ |So)(|X¯o′′ |+ 1)
(79)
Manipulating the probabilities, (79) can be rewritten as:
pS(So′)
pS(So′)
(
pS(X¯o′)
pS(So)
NG(pS(·|X¯o′)) +
pS(Xo′)
pS(So)
(|X¯o′ |+ 1)
)
+
+
pS(So′′)
pS(So′′)
(
pS(X¯o′′)
pS(So)
NG(pS(·|X¯o′′)) +
pS(Xo′′)
pS(So)
(|X¯o′′ |+ 1)
) (80)
Reorganizing the terms, (80) becomes:
pS(So′)
pS(So)
(
pS(X¯o′ |So)NG(pS(·|X¯o′)) + pS(Xo′ |So)(|X¯o′ |+ 1)
)
+
+
pS(So′′)
pS(So)
(
pS(X¯o′′ |So)NG(pS(·|X¯o′′)) + pS(Xo′′ |So)(|X¯o′′ |+ 1)
) (81)
Note that both Xo′ and Xo′′ are subsets of Xo, and therefore since ν is
monotonic with respect to blocks, ν(ω, pS(·|Xo′)),Xo′) ≥ ν(ω, pS(·|Xo)),Xo),
and correspondingly ν(ω, pS(·|Xo′′ )),Xo′′) ≥ ν(ω, pS(·|Xo)),Xo). Therefore
we can reintroduce the min and conclude that (81) is greater or equal than
the following:
pS(So′)
pS(So)
min
X⊆So
ν(ω,pS(·|X ),X )≥w
(
pS(X¯ |So)NG(pS(·|X¯ )) + pS(X|So)(|X¯ |+ 1)
)
+
+
pS(So′′)
pS(So)
min
X⊆So
ν(ω,pS(·|X ),X )≥w
(
pS(X¯ )
pS(So)
NG(pS(·|X¯ )) +
pS(X )
pS(So)
(|X¯ |+ 1)
)
(82)
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Using the definition of W -guessing entropy, (82) can be rewritten as:
1
pS(So)
(pS(So′)WNGν,w(ω, pS(·|So′),So′))+
+
1
pS(So)
(pS(So′′)WNGν,w(ω, pS(·|So′′),So′′))
(83)
Comparing (73) and (83):
pS(So)WNGw,ν(ω, pS(·|So),So) ≥pS(So′)WNGw,ν(ω, pS(·|So′),So′)+
+ pS(So′′)WNGw,ν(ω, pS(·|So′′ ),So′′)
(84)
And since W -guessing entropy is a composable measure, from (84) we con-
clude that by splitting blocks one can never increase the W -guessing entropy
of the partition.
2. (⇐) We reason by counter-positive and show that if P 6⊑ P′, then there
exists a probability distribution pS on secrets and aW -measure ν that makes
WNGν,w(ω, pS,P
′) < WNGν,w(ω, pS ,P). By Proposition 15, NG(ω, pS,P) is
a special case of WNGν,w(ω, pS ,P) for some ω and when ν is the monotonic
with respect to blocks W -measure WCER, so we can use as our counter-
example the same probability distribution used in Theorem 4 to prove that
NGn is consistent with respect to the LoI.
⊓⊔
Proposition 15. Let S be a set of secrets distributed according to pS, and Ca
be an attack. Then the following holds:
NG(pS , Ca) = WNG1,WCER(ωbin , pS , Ca)
where and WCER is the worth of certainty measure.
Proof. By definition, WNG1,WCER(ωbin , pS) is given by:
min
S′⊆S
WCER(ωbin ,pS(·|S′))≥1
(
pS(S¯ ′)NG(pS(·|S¯ ′)) + pS(S ′)(|S¯ ′|+ 1)
)
(85)
Note that the only when |S ′| = 1 we can have WCER(ωbin , pS(·|S ′)) ≥ 1. As
usual, w.l.o.g. in (86) we assume that the elements of S are ordered in non-
increasing probabilities, and (85) becomes:
min
s′∈S



|S\{s′}|∑
i=1
pS(si) · i

+ pS(s′)(|S\{s′}|+ 1)

 (86)
But (86) is actually the definition of the guessing entropy NG(pS). From this,
and from Definition 5, for every Ca it follows immediately that NG(pS , Ca) =
WNG1,WCER(ωbin , pS , Ca). ⊓⊔
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A.VIII Results regarding W -Shannon entropy
Proposition 16. Let S be a set of secrets composed by the fields in F and Ca
be an attack. Let ν be a W -measure that is monotonic for observations, and
0 ≤ w ≤ ω(F). For every distribution pS on S and every worth assignment ω
the following holds.
WSEw,ν(ω, pS , Ca) ≤WSEw,ν(ω, pS)
Proof. By definition of W -Shannon entropy, WSEw,ν(ω, pS , Ca) is given by:∑
o∈O
pa(o) min
P∈LoI(S)
∀S′∈P ν(ω,pS(·|S′,o))≥w
SE(pP) (87)
Because ν is monotonic for observations, for every o′ ∈ O it is the case that
ν(ω, pS(·|S ′, o)) ≥ ν(ω, pS(·|S ′)), so we can take the max out of the summation
to deduce that (87) must be smaller or equal than:
min
P∈LoI(S)
∀S′∈P ν(ω,pS(·|S′))≥w
SE(pP)
∑
o∈O
pa(o) =
min
P∈LoI(S)
∀S′∈P ν(ω,pS(·|S′))≥w
SE(pP) (88)
And noting that (88) is exactly the definition of WSEw,ν(ω, pS) concludes the
proof. ⊓⊔
Proposition 17. Let S be a set of secrets composed by the fields in F . Then
for every two partitions P and P′ in the LoI of S the following holds:
P ⊑ P′ ⇔ ∀w ∀ν ∀ω ∀pSWSEw,ν(ω, pS,P) ≥WSEw,ν(ω, pS ,P′)
where 0 ≤ w ≤ ω(f), and ν is any composable W -measure that is monotonic
with respect to blocks.
Proof. 1. (⇒) By definition, the value of WSEw,ν(ω, pS,P) is given by:∑
So∈P
pa(So) min
P
∗∈LoI(S)
∀S∗∈P∗ ν(ω,pS(·|S∗,So))≥w
SE(pP∗) (89)
Since each block of P is split into blocks of P′, (89) can be rewritten as:
∑
So∈P
∑
So′∈P′So′⊆So
pa(So′) min
P
∗∈LoI(S)
∀S∗∈P∗ ν(ω,pS(·|S∗,So))≥w
SE(pP∗) (90)
38
Because So′ ⊆ So, and because ν is monotonic with respect to blocks,
ν(ω, pS(·|S∗,So′)) ≥ ν(ω, pS(·|S∗,So)). Hence we can change the condition
of the minimization so (90) is greater or equal than:∑
So∈P
∑
So′∈P′So′⊆So
pa(So′) min
P
∗∈LoI(S)
∀S∗∈P∗ ν(ω,pS(·|S∗,So′))≥w
SE(pP∗) (91)
And grouping the summations together, (91) can be rewritten as:∑
So′∈P′
pa(So′) min
P
∗∈LoI(S)
∀S∗∈P∗ ν(ω,pS(·|S∗,So′ ))≥w
SE(pP∗) =
WSEw,ν(ω, pS ,P
′)
2. (⇐) We reason by counter-positive and show that if P 6⊑ P′, then there
exists a probability distribution pS on secrets, a F -roofed worth assignment
ω, and a value w that make WSEw,ν(P
′) < WSEw,ν(P). By Proposition 18,
SE(pS ,P) is a special case of WSEw,ν(ω, pS ,P) for some ω and when ν is
the monotonic with respect to blocks W -measure WCER, so we can use as
our counter-example the same probability distribution used in Theorem 4 to
prove that SE is consistent with respect to the LoI.
⊓⊔
Proposition 18. Let S be a set of secrets distributed according to pS, and Ca
be an attack. Then the following holds:
SE(pS , Ca) =WSE1,WCER(ωbin , pS, Ca)
Proof. By definition:
WSE1,WCER(ωbin , pS) = min
P∈LoI(S)
∀S′∈P WCER(ω,pS(·|S′))≥1
SE(pP) (92)
In the minimization in (92), note that the only P ∈ LoI(S) satisfying ∀S ′ ∈
P WCER(ω, pS(·|S
′)) ≥ 1 is the partition where every block contains exactly one
secret, which means that P coincides with the set S. Therefore (92) is actually
the same as SE(pS). From this, and from Definition 6, for every Ca it follows
immediately that SE(pS, Ca) = WSE1,WCER(ωbin , pS, Ca). ⊓⊔
A.IX Results regarding W -probability of guessing
Proposition 19. Let S be a set of secrets composed by the fields in F and Ca
be an attack. Let ν be a W -measure that is monotonic for observations, n ≥ 0 be
the number of guesses allowed for the adversary, and 0 ≤ w ≤ ω(F). For every
distribution pS on S and every worth assignment ω the following holds.
WPG∈w,n,ν(ω, pS , Ca) ≥WPG
∈
w,n,ν(ω, pS)
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Proof. By definition of W -probability of guessing, WPG∈
w,n,ν(ω, pS , Ca) is given
by: ∑
o∈O
pa(o) max
P∈LoI(S)
|P|≤2n
∑
S′∈P
ν(ω,pS(·|S′,o))≥w
pS(S
′|o) (93)
Because ν is monotonic for observations, for every o′ ∈ O it is the case that
ν(ω, pS(·|S ′, o)) ≥ ν(ω, pS(·|S ′)), so we can take the max out of the summation
to deduce that (93) must be greater or equal than:
max
P∈LoI(S)
|P|≤2n
∑
S′∈P
ν(ω,pS(·|S′))≥w
∑
o∈O
pa(o)pS(S
′|o) =
max
P∈LoI(S)
|P|≤2n
∑
S′∈P
ν(ω,pS(·|S′))≥w
pS(S
′) (94)
And noting that (94) is exactly the definition of WPG∈
w,n,ν(ω, pS) concludes the
proof. ⊓⊔
Proposition 20. Let S be a set of secrets composed by the fields in F . Then
for every two partitions P and P′ in the LoI of S the following holds:
P ⊑ P′ ⇔ ∀w ∀n ∀ν ∀ω ∀pSWPG∈w,n,ν(ω, pS ,P) ≤WPG
∈
w,n,ν(ω, pS,P
′)
where 0 ≤ w ≤ ω(f), n ≥ 0, and ν is any composable W -measure that is mono-
tonic with respect to blocks.
Proof. 1. (⇒) By definition, the value of WPG∈w,n,ν(ω, pS ,P) is given by:∑
So∈P
pa(So) max
P
∗∈LoI(S)
|P∗|≤2n
∑
S∗∈P∗
ν(ω,pS(·|S∗,So))≥w
pS(S
∗|So) (95)
Since each block of P is split into blocks of P′, (95) can be rewritten as:∑
So∈P
∑
So′∈P′So′⊆So
pa(So′) max
P
∗∈LoI(S)
|P∗|≤2n
∑
S∗∈P∗
ν(ω,pS(·|S∗,So))≥w
pS(S
∗|So) (96)
Because So′ ⊆ So, and because ν is monotonic with respect to blocks,
ν(ω, pS(·|S∗,So′)) ≥ ν(ω, pS(·|S∗,So)). Also because So′ ⊆ So, pS(S∗|So) ≤
pS(S∗|So′). Hence we can safely change the innermost summation so (96) is
smaller or equal than:∑
So∈P
∑
So′∈P′So′⊆So
pa(So′) max
P
∗∈LoI(S)
|P∗|≤2n
∑
S∗∈P∗
ν(ω,pS(·|S∗,So′ ))≥w
pS(S
∗|So′) (97)
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And grouping the summations together, (97) can be rewritten as:
∑
So′∈P′
pa(So′) max
P
∗∈LoI(S)
|P∗|≤2n
∑
S∗∈P∗
ν(ω,pS(·|S∗,So′))≥w
pS(S
∗|So′) =
WPG∈w,n,ν(ω, pS ,P
′)
2. (⇐) We reason by counter-positive and show that if P 6⊑ P′, then there exists
a probability distribution pS on secrets, a F -roofed worth assignment ω, a
number of tries n ≥ 0, and a value w that make WPG∈w,n,ν(ω, pS ,P) >
WPG∈
w,n,ν(ω, pS,P
′). By Proposition 21, PG∈n(pS ,P) is a special case of
WPG∈
w,n,ν(ω, pS,P) for some ω, ν is the monotonic with respect to blocks
W -measure WCER, and w = ω(F), so we can use as our counter-example
the same probability distribution used in Proposition 4 to prove that PG∈n
is consistent with respect to the LoI.
⊓⊔
Proposition 21. Let S be a set of secrets distributed according to pS, and Ca
be an attack. Then the following holds for all n ≥ 0:
PG∈n(pS , Ca) =WPG
∈
1,n,WCER(ωbin , pS , Ca)
where WCER is the worth of certainty measure.
Proof. By definition, WPG∈1,n,WCER(ωbin , pS) is given by:
max
P∈LoI(S)
|P|≤2n
∑
S′∈P
WCER(ωbin ,pS(·|S′))≥1
pS(·|S
′) (98)
Note that the only blocks S ′ ∈ P satisfying WCER(ωbin , pS(·|S ′)) ≥ 1 are
the ones containing exactly one secret. Therefore the maximization in (98) is
achieved when P coincides with the set S, which means that (98) is the same as
PG∈n(pS). From this, and from Definition 7, for every Ca it follows immediately
that PG∈n(pS , Ca) = WPG
∈
1,n,WCER(ωbin , pS, Ca). ⊓⊔
A.X Results regarding the comparison with g-leakage
Proposition 2. Given a set of secrets S and a set of guesses Z, there is no gain
function g : Z × S → R+ such that, for all priors pS on S, and all partitions
P on the LoI for S, it is the case that: (i) Vg(pS) = WCER(ω, pS), or (ii)
Vg(pS) = SE(pS), or (iii) Hg(pS) = SE(pS).
Proof. It follows from Proposition 22 and Proposition 23.
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Proposition 22. Given a set of secrets S and a set of guesses Z, there is no
gain function g : Z×S → R+ such that, for all priors pS on S, and all partitions
P on the LoI for S, it is the case that:
Vg(pS) = WCER(ω, pS)
Proof. Let the set of fields be F = {f1} such that domain(f1) = {0, 1}, so the
set of secrets in this case is S = {0, 1}. Consider a non-trivial worth assignment
ω such that ω({f1}) > 0. To derive a contradiction, we assume there is a gain
function g and some set of guesses Z satisfying Vg(pS) = WCER(ω, pS) for every
prior.
Consider a prior p′S such that p
′
S(0) = 0 and p
′
S(1) = 1. The g-vulnerability of
P′ is Vg(p′S) = maxz g(z, 1). Clearly, WCER(ω, p
′
S) = ω({f1}). So if (22) holds,
then there must exist z′ ∈ Z such that g(z′, 1) = ω({f1}) > 0.
Now consider the distribution p′′S such that p
′′
S(0) = p
′′
S(1) = 0.5. The g-
vulnerability of p′′S can be calculated to be Vg(p
′′
S) = 0.5maxz (g(z, 0) + g(z, 1)),
and clearly there is no deducible field from pS , i.e., WCER(ω, p
′′
S) = 0. So if (22)
holds, then, for every z ∈ Z, g(z, 0) + g(z, 1) = 0. But that contradicts our
previous conclusion that there exists z′ making g(z′, 1) > 0. ⊓⊔
Proposition 23. Given a set of secrets S and a set of guesses Z, there is no
gain function g : Z×S → R+ such that, for all priors pS on S, and all partitions
P on the LoI for S, it is the case that:
Vg(pS) =SE(pS) or
Hg(pS) =SE(pS)
Proof. – We start by writing the equality Vg(pS) = SE(pS) as follows:
max
z
∑
s
pS(s)g(z, s) =
∑
s
pS(s) log(pS(s)) (99)
We prove the result by contradiction. Assume there exists a gain function
g satisfying (99) for every prior pS . In particular, (99) must hold for the
prior δs′ , where s
′ is an element of S. Since δs′ is a point-mass distribution,
SE(δs′) = 0, and from (99) we deduce:
max
z
∑
s
δs′(s)g(z, s) =max
z

1 · g(z, sk) + ∑
s6=s1
0 · g(z, s)


=max
z
g(z, s′)
=0 (100)
But from (100) it follows that for every s′ ∈ S, there is no guess z ∈ Z
giving a non-zero gain. If this is the case, no distribution pS on S such that
SE(pS) > 0 (e.g., the uniform distribution) can be captured by such a gain
function, and we arrive at a contradiction.
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– We start by rewriting the equality Hg(pS) = SE(pS) as follows:
max
z
∑
s
pS(s)g(z, s) =2
∑
s
pS(s) log(pS(s)) (101)
We prove the result by contradiction. Assume there exists a gain function
g satisfying (101) for every prior pS . In particular, (101) must hold for the
prior δs1 . Since δs1 is a point-mass distribution, SE(δs1) = 0, and from (101)
we deduce:
max
z
∑
s
δs1(s)g(z, s) =
max
z

1 · g(z, s1) + ∑
s6=s1
0 · g(z, s)

 =
max
z
g(z, s1) =
20
1 (102)
And from (102) it follows that:
∃z′ ∈ Z such that g(z′, s1) = 1 (103)
Now consider the prior p′S such that p
′
S(s1) = 0.75, p
′
S(s2) = 0.25, and
p′S(si) = 0 for all 3 ≤ i ≤ n. Knowing that SE(p
′
S) = 0.8113, (101) becomes:
max
z
∑
s
p′S(s)g(z, s) =max
z

0.75 · g(z, s1) + 0.25 · g(z, s2) + ∑
s6=s1
s6=s2
0 · g(z, s)


=max
z
(0.75 · g(z, s1) + 0.25 · g(z, s2))
=2−0.8113
=0.5699 (104)
Of course any guess z maximizing (104) is at least as good as the guess z′
we determined to exist in (103), and therefore:
max
z
(0.75 · g(z, s1) + 0.25 · g(z, s2)) ≥0.75 · g(z
′, s1) + 0.25 · g(z′, s2)
=0.75 + 0.25 · g(z′, s2) (105)
Noting that g(z′, s2) ≥ 0, from (105) we derive that
max
z
(0.75 · g(z, s1) + 0.25 · g(z, s2)) ≥ 0.75 (106)
And hence we have (106) contradicting (104).
⊓⊔
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Proposition 24. Given a set of secrets S = {s1, . . . , sn} with n ≥ 4, and a set
of guesses Z, there is no gain function g : Z ×S → R+ such that, for all priors
pS on S, it is the case that Hg(pS) = NG(pS)
Proof. We start by writing the equality Hg(pS) = NG(pS) as follows:
− log
(
max
z
∑
s
pS(s)g(z, s)
)
=
∑
i
i · pS(si) (107)
As usual, w.l.o.g. in (107) we assume that the elements of S are ordered in
non-increasing probabilities. We then prove the result by contradiction. Assume
there exists a gain function g satisfying (107) for every prior pS. In particular,
(107) must hold for the prior p′S such that p
′
S(si) =
1
n−1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1,
and p′S(sn) = 0. We can calculate the guessing entropy of p
′
S as follows:
NG(p′S) =
n∑
i=1
i · p′S(si)
=
(
n−1∑
i=1
i ·
1
n− 1
)
+ n · 0
=
n
2
(108)
On the other hand, Hg(p
′
S) can be calculated as follows.
Hg(p
′
S) =− log
(
max
z
∑
s
p′S(s)g(z, s)
)
=− log

max
z



∑
s6=sn
1
n− 1
g(z, s)

+ 0 · g(z, sn)




=− log

 1
n− 1
max
z
∑
s6=sn
g(z, s)

 (109)
Substituting (108) and (109) in (107) we obtain:
max
z
∑
s6=sn
g(z, s) = (n− 1)2−
n
2 (110)
And from (110) we infer that:
∃z′ ∈ Z such that
∑
s6=sn
g(z, s) = (n− 1)2−
n
2 (111)
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Now consider the prior p′′S such that p
′′
S(si) =
1
n
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. We can
calculate the guessing entropy p′′S as follows:
NG(p′′S) =
n∑
i=1
i · pS(si)
=
n∑
i=1
i ·
1
n
=
n+ 1
2
(112)
Applying now (112) to (107), we deduce:
max
z
∑
s
p′′S(s)g(z, s) =2
−n+1
2 (113)
But (113) can be rewritten as:
max
z
∑
s
g(z, s) =n2−
n+1
2 (114)
Of course any guess z maximizing (114) is at least as good as the guess z′ we
determined to exist in (111), and therefore:
max
z
∑
s
g(z, s) ≥
∑
s
g(z′, s)
=

∑
s6=sn
g(z′, s)

+ g(z′, sn)
=(n− 1)2−
n
2 + g(z′, sn) (115)
Noting that g(z′, sn) ≥ 0, from (115) we derive that
max
z
∑
s
g(z, s) ≥ (n− 1)2−
n
2 (116)
Comparing (114) and (116), we get a contradiction whenever:
(n− 1)2−
n
2 > n2−
n+1
2 (117)
Solving (117) for n, we find n >
(
1−
√
2
2
)−1
≈ 3.4142. That is, whenever the
set of secrets has 4 or more elements, the gain-function we look for does not exist
in general. ⊓⊔
A.XI Results regarding the design of worth assignments
Proposition 1. For every f, f′ ∈ P(F): f ⊆ f′ iff Pf ⊑ Pf′ .
45
Proof. (⇒) Take an arbitrary element x′ ∈ S[f′] with corresponding block
Ss[f′]=x′ = {s ∈ S|s[f
′] = x′}. For any arbitrary subset f ⊆ f′, it is clear that ev-
ery s ∈ S such that s[f′] = x′ will also satisfy s[f] = x for some x ⊆ x′. Therefore
for some x we have Ss[f]=x ⊆ Ss[f′]=x′ . Since x
′ and f were chosen arbitrarily, it
follows that whenever f ⊆ f′, every block of Pf′ is contained in a block of Pf, and
therefore Pf ⊑ Pf′ .
(⇐) If Pf ⊑ Pf′ then, by definition, every block Ss[f′]=x′ ∈ Pf′ is contained in
some block Ss[f]=x ∈ Pf. This means that s[f] is constant in every block of of Pf′ ,
i.e., Pf′ discriminates the contents of the structure f. But since, by definition, Pf′
discriminates no field outside the structure f′, it must be the case that f ⊆ f′.
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